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Introduction 
Musing on the rationale for opting for distance when confronted with 
proximity, Robert Frost wrote, in a famous poem, that «Good Fences 
Make Good Neighbors.>>1 Few expressions come closer to capturing the 
ambivalence that characterized the Icelandic attitude toward the defense 
relationship with the United States, 1945-1960. Despite close political and 
economic ties, there was bound to be a «Mending Wall>> between a great 
power with global strategic interests, and a tiny island nation, whose 
security concerns regularly conflicted with a desire to maintain its own 
distinct national and cultural identity. To be sure, the United States and 
Iceland had one thing in common: they profited tremendously in material 
terms from World War II and suffered minimal war losses. But despite 
surface similarities, the differences were, of course, far greater. With a 
population of about 140 million, the United States emerged from World. War 
II as the predominant power. 2 In contrast, Iceland was a political and 
economic non-entity, with only about 130,000 inhabitants and totally 
dependent on a single industry-fishing-for its survival. It was inevitable 
that this enormous gap in power and resources would affect U.S.-Icelandic 
relations during the postwar period. In Iceland, it manifested itself in acute 
tensions between nationalistic and internationalist impulses--tensions 
aggravated by domestic political realigrunents and by the shifting winds of 
the Cold. War. It was an unpredictable mixture of nationalistic fervor 
tempered by realistic calculations. Complicating the political equation was 
the existence of a strong pro-Moscow Socialist party, whose electoral 
strength in Europe was only matched by its French, Italian, and Finnish 
counterparts. True, the vast majority of the Icelandic people were pro-
Western in outlook, and the strategic importance of Iceland had been 
starkly brought home to them by the British and American military 
presence during World War II. Yet, the dual experience of being unarmed 
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and subservient to foreign powers for centuries, made them reluctant Cold 
Warriors. Indeed, it was not until 1944 that the last vestiges of Danish rule 
were shed and that Iceland became a republic. For this reason, the 
Icelanders were, at best, unsure about the proposition of providing land in 
return for security. The view that it would infringe Iceland's sovereignty to 
maintain close defense relations with the United States was by no means 
limited to the Socialist Party. 
At the end of World War 11, the Americans judged the importance of 
Iceland solely by its strategic location. American military planners saw the 
extension of U.S. defense parameters overseas as the logical outgrowth of 
strategic realities during World War IL Postwar bases requirements were 
determined more by a general sense of vulnerability than by a specific 
perception of the Soviet Union as a threat.' Because attacks against the 
North American Continent could only be launched from Europe. and Asia, 
the United States would have to encircle the Western Hemisphere with a 
defensive ring of outlying bases. The purpose was to possess control of 
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and keep potential foes far from North 
American Continent. On the basis of the Pearl Harbor experience, the 
advance of technology, and the development of the atomic bomb, the 
Americans concluded that forward bases would enhance the chances of 
surviving a nuclear attack and of destroying the aggressor. 
The other strategic consideration was the need to project American 
power quickly and effectively into different parts of the world. In the 
absence of inter-continental bombers, the United States would thus be able 
to launch an air offensive from overseas bases such as Iceland, the Azores, 
and Greenland against potential adversaries. The base system would enable 
the United States to preserve its access to vital raw materials, deny these 
resources to a prospective enemy, contribute to the preservation of peace 
and stability in troubled regions, safeguard sea lanes, and, if necessary, 
conduct an air offensive against the industrial infrastructure of a potential 
adversary. In short, control of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans was consid-
ered indispensable to U.S. national security. 
It was only by 1945 that the perception of the Soviets as likely enemies 
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came to dominate American strategic thinking. Political and budgetary 
constraints, however, forced U.S. military planners to scale back their 
plans, if not their ambition, for a forward defense in the early postwar 
period. The Americans failed, for example, to persuade the Icelandic 
Government to conclude a base lease agreement and had to settle for 
landing rights for military aircraft enroute to Europe. These transit rights 
would permit the rapid augmentation of American bases in wartime as well 
as speed up the movement of air units. 4 It was not until the outbreak of the 
Korean War that the United States eventually achieved its goal of establish-
ing a permanent military foothold in Iceland through a bilateral defense 
treaty. 
It should not come as a surprise that the asymmetrical nature of U.S.-
Icelandic relations should have become the main source of tension. For the 
Americans, the value oflceland for U.S. national security was only meas-
urable in constant terms: it was a strategic certainty so long as there was a 
Soviet threat. The intentions of the Soviet Union were regarded less 
important than its capability to inflict a heavy military damage on the United 
States. The Icelanders never accepted such a definition of the concept of 
security. Domestic political reconfigurations and international developments 
always influenced Icelandic threat perceptions. 
Indeed, the U.S. military base in Iceland was the most hotly contested 
domestic political issue during this period. The proponents oflceland's 
Western military integration argued that a defense relationship with the 
United States and NATO was a political and strategic necessity. Given the 
military importance of Iceland, it was irresponsible to leave the country and 
its airfields unprotected. The opponents believed, however, that neutrality 
provided more security, because the U.S. military presence served Ameri-
can national interests, made Iceland more vulnerable to enemy attack, and 
was harmful to Icelandic culture. Of course, there were subtler variations 
on these themes. Indeed, one can argue that the debate over Icelandic 
defense policies 1945-1960 centered on ways to find a non-existent middle 
course that would reduce Iceland's dependence on the U.S. without 
jeopardizing its security. From the perspective of the center-right, this 
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notion found its expression in efforts to strengthen the Icelandic role in the 
functions of the Keflavik base or-to a lesser degree--to form a Home 
Guard or a militia to complement and eventually replace U.S. troops for 
both internal and external security reasons. The center-left, on the other 
hand sought to eliminate the need for a U.S. military presence in peacetime 
by rclying on Iceland's membership in NATO. Both approaches ultimately 
proved to be unsuccessful, but they were extremely important in shaping 
Icelandic security perceptions. 
Despite the strategic importance of Iceland in the Cold War, few 
historians have done research on U.S.-Icelandic relations. The Icelandic 
historian Th6r Whitehead has written most extensively on the bilateral 
relationship in the early postwar period. He writes from the realist point of 
view and stresses the geopolitical logic of the U.S.-Icelandic relationship in 
the face of a Soviet threat, the revolutionary implications of the Marxist-
Leninist doctrine, and the inability of the Icelanders to defend themselves.' 
1n his dissertation, El far Loftsson deals with some of the same issues if on 
a less ambitious scale. 6 Steeped in the «revisionist» mould, he is critical of 
the U.S.-Icelandic relationship, raising suspicions about the «cozy>> rela-
tionship that existed between American Embassy officials and Icelandic 
cabinet ministers. He exaggerates the degree of U .S. intervention in Icelan-
dic domestic affairs and underestimates the influences oflocal initiatives on 
American behavior. But by stressing anti-Communist ideological ties 
between American and Icelandic officials, he tackled an issue that warrants 
· further examination within the bilateral context. Several important 
biographies and memoirs of leading Icelandic politicians during this period 
have been published, even if they are inevitably marred by self-serving 
accounts. 7 Given the intensity of the public debate over the presence of 
U.S. forces in Iceland, the paucity of scholarly works on U.S.-Icelandic 
relations during the 1950s' may seem strange. Unfamiliarity with the 
Icelandic language has undoubtedly kept U.S. scholars from the topic and 
the lack of documentary sources has traditionally hampered research in 
Iceland. In the last few years much has changed for the better in this area: 
with increased access to the Icelandic archives, it is now possible to 
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complement the rich U.S. documentary material with Icelandic sources. 
Using recently declassified records in U.S., Icelandic, and, to a lesser 
extent, British and German archives, I seek to broaden the scope of the 
inquiry both in narrative and theoretical terms. Chronologically, I will focus 
on several turning points in U.S.-Icelandic relations !945-1960: the debate 
over the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iceland in 1945-1946; Iceland's 
entry into NATO in 1949; the arrival ofU.S. troops in Iceland in 1951; the 
demand for the revocation of the U.S.-Icelandic Defense Treaty in 1956; 
and the stabilization in the bilateral relationship in 1959-1960. 
My purpose is to address four key problems in U.S.-Icelandic relations. 
First, by concentrating on continuities and discontinuities in American war 
planning and strategy, I want to assess the military importance of Iceland 
during this period of the Cold War. Conversely, I will seek to identifY the 
domestic political constraints thai forced the Americans to modifY their 
plans for the military use oflceland. Second, I will explore how ideological 
affinity, especially anti-Communism, shaped U.S.-Icelandic cooperation in 
the struggle against potential external and internal threats--against the 
Soviet Union and the Socialist Party in Iceland. In this sense, ideology 
played a role in reconciling conflicting national interests and in finding 
common security concerns. Third, I will try to detect the international and 
domestic sources oflceland's policy toward the United States by exploring 
the interactions between events and processes. The purpose is to evaluate 
the impact of such events as the Czech coup d'etat in 1948, the Korean 
War in 1950, and the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 on Icelandic security 
perceptions as well as on the relationship with the United States. Similarly, 
I will attempt to explain how a domestic process--the political realignment 
in favor of the Left during the 1950s-affected bilateral relations. Finally, I 
will examine the political forces that contested U.S. influence in Iceland. 
Thus I will assess the effectiveness and limits of the strategies employed 
by such elements as pro-Moscow Socialists, non-Communist neutralists, 
and nationalistic intellectuals in the struggle against the presence ofU.S. 
troops on Icelandic soil. 
No single theoretical model captures the complexity ofU.S.-Icelandic 
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relations 1945-1960. But I believe that two central theories come closest to 
describing the dynamics of the interaction between Americans and Iceland-
ers during this period. I will argue that the concept of «national security» 
Jay at the heart ofU .S. interest in Iceland. By seeking a n_'ilitary pre_sence in 
this strategic location, the Americans were concerned wtth protecting 
domestic values-such as territorial integrity, political institutions, and 
liberal capitalism-from potential external threats. Such factors as political 
stability, social cohesion, and economic productivity were considered 
equally important as preponderant military strength. As Melvyn Leftler, the 
most persuasive proponent of the <<national security» thesis, has argued, 
the theory assumes that fears of foreign threats are the result of both real 
dangers in the external environment and ideological motivations, cultural 
symbols, and mistaken images.• To further their own security interests, the 
Americans had to make sure that a certain level of political and economic 
stability was maintained in Iceland. And whenever economics clashed with 
. strategy, the United States gave precedence to military security. In the 
economic sphere, therefore, Iceland gained much from its military relation-
ship with the United States. 
From the Icelandic perspective, Geir Lundestad's «Empire by Invita-
tion» thesis is-with important qualifications-the most persuasive theo-
retical framework for understanding Icelandic policies toward the United 
States.'• American involvement in Icelandic affairs was often encouraged, 
not only because Washington's forms of control were much more benign 
than those of Moscow's but also because Icelandic politicians thought that 
it would enhance Icelandic military and economic security. What should be 
emphasized, however, is that the Icelanders did not always share the same 
motives or concerns as the Americans." The appeal of the United States 
was not due to the attractiveness of its political economy-with its heavy 
emphasis on liberal capitalism at the expense of state intervention in the 
economy- but more to its wealth and power. 
Although the «national security» and the «empire by invitation» theses 
provide the most fruitful framework for the discussion of U.S.-Icelandic 
relations, they do not account for all their dimensions. Other theories-
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such as bureaucratic politics, 12 cognitive theory, 13 corporatism, 14 and 
European revisionism-have important explanatory power, even if at a 
subordinate level. As I will make clear here, jurisdictional and bureaucratic 
fights between the Defense Department and the State Department had 
considerable influence on American perceptions of the political and military 
threats facing Iceland. Similarly, the need to reach a consensus between 
two or more parties within·a coalition government in Iceland was a crucial 
factor in defining the limits of the defense relationship with the United 
States and NATO. It is, furthermore, impossible to understand U.S. and 
Icelandic decision making during this period without taking into account 
the notion of threat perceptions. It is very unlikely that the Icelandic 
Government would have requested U.S. military protection in the absence 
of the war scare triggered by the Korean War. Similarly, the U.S. Defense 
Department's perceptions and misperceptions of the vulnerability of the 
Icelandic police force to a Socialist coup d 'etat led to unilateral military 
plans to respond to such an eventuality. The corporatist model's stress on 
the link between state and society is also of importance here: in few other 
areas did the interests between American and Icelandic foreign policy elites 
converge as clearly as in efforts to contain Communism within the trade 
union movement. 
Finally, I would like to stress the constraints faced by the Truman and 
Eisenhower Administrations in their diplomacy and propaganda in Iceland . 
. This strikes at the heart of the historiographical debate over U.S.-European 
relations after World War II. European and American «revisionists» have 
sought to downplay the role of the United States in the economic, political, 
and military reconstruction of Europe, arguing that the Europeans them-
. selves had much more leverage than traditionally assumed." Many of the 
criticisms leveled by the «revisionists» against American works on the Cold 
War and on European reconstruction are warranted. 16 I will make the case 
here that the Icelanders were not only successful in restraining the United 
States in Iceland in its quest for expanded military rights but also in 
achieving maximum political and economic benefits at minimal costs. But 
although the <<revisionists» have corrected the mistaken notion of American 
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omnipotence, they have sometimes gone too far in the other direction. 
Despite the limits of U.S. power, there is no reason to deny that the 
Americans exerted a great deal of influence on developments in Iceland in 
the 1940s and 1950s through their political and economic strength. 
DEFENCE ST\JOIES :J/1999 11 
U.S.-Icelandic Security Relations: The 
Background, 1940-1945 
Considering the close political and defense relationship between Iceland and 
the United States since World War Il, it may seem surprising that it has no 
historical roots. Apart from having practically no trade relations with 
Iceland, the United States did not even have diplomatic representation in 
Reykjavik untill940. 17 During the 1930s, U.S. airlines flirted with the idea 
of securing landing rights in Iceland as part of their efforts to develop 
transatlantic routes for commercial aviation. But they quickly abandoned it, 
relying instead on other more profitable routes." It was not until World 
War II-or, more precisely, until the British occupation of Iceland in 
1940-that the United States became interested in the strategic location of 
Iceland. Even if historians are still sharply divided over President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt's war strategy, the United States was, at that time, neither 
prepared to abandon its policy of non-intervention nor its status as a non-
belligerent and neutral power. 19 But following Hitler's military successes in 
the Balkans in the spring of 1941, Roosevelt bowed to British pressure and 
agreed to replace the British occupation force in Iceland with U.S. troops. 
This sudden development was not totally unexpected. Since the out-
break of the war, Iceland had been looking for ways to establish defense 
and trade ties with the United States.20 A National Unity Government had to 
deal with the wartime emergency, but it was reluctant to give up Iceland's 
policy of «eternal neutrality>> as stated in a proclamation issued in connec-
tion with the Constitutional Treaty with Denmark in 1918. This government 
was composed of the largest party, the center-right Independence Party, 
which traditionally captured about 40% of the vote and whose popular 
support cut across class lines; the center Progressive Party, which usually 
received about 25% of the vote and represented farming interests, and the 
Social Democratic Party, which was a strong force within the labor 
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movement, but rarely extracted more than about 15% of the vote. In view 
of the likelihood of a German or British occupation in 1940, this govern-
ment broached-with characteristic Icelandic tentativeness21-the possibil-
ity of placing Iceland under the Monroe Doctrine.22 The Americans did not 
rule out such an agreement, but in the absence of historical precedents, 
they were unwilling to commit themselves.23 
It was only after the British forced the issue into the open that the 
Americans decided to approach the Icelandic Government about a U.S. 
defense role in Iceland. 24 Having been presented with a fait accompli by the 
British in 1940, the Icelandic Government was unwilling to comply with 
Roosevelt's wish to request the military protection of the United States. But 
it agreed to issue a statement to the effect that the military protection of the 
United States was compatible with Iceland's national interest. Shortly 
thereafter, Iceland concluded a defense treaty with the United States in 
return for economic concessions. 25 On July 7, 1941, a small contingent of 
U.S. troops landed in Iceland-with thousands more to follow in the next 
two years. It was the first overt American step toward participation in the 
war, even if the United States remained, iri theory, a non-belligerent until 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor six months later. 
In Iceland, legitimate questions were raised of whether this was a 
voluntary agreement, since the Icelandic Government had only a few days 
to accept the defense treaty.26 But no one could deny that it was based on a 
stronger legal foundation than the British occupation, which was, of 
course, a flagrant violation of international law. Therefore, the Icelandic 
Parliament, the A/thing, approved the treaty with 39 votes against 3. The 
only opposition came from the Socialist Unity Party on nationalistic 
grounds. As it turned out, the Socialists were, in fact, more sympathetic 
toward the military presence than they were willing to admit publicly. 
When Hitler repudiated the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact by invading 
the Soviet Union in 1941, they abandoned their anti-Western rhetoric and 
began to support the Allied cause. 27 It is, indeed, a pre-Cold War irony that 
in 1941-1942, the Americans considered the pro-Moscow Socialists among 
their most loyal supporters in Iceland.28 That view, it turned out, changed 
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abruptly in I 944-1945, when the Socialists renewed their attacks on 
American capitalism and raised suspicions about U.S. postwar aims. But 
their early stance toward the U.S. presence reaffirmed what came close to 
a rare domestic political consensus on Iceland's external relations. 
Even if the American military force encountered no popular resistance 
in Iceland, there were bound to be drawbacks to the abnormal wartime 
situation. In 1943, the number of soldiers in Iceland reached a peak of 
50,000 in a country, whose population did not exceed 130,000. For a 
while, the troops outnumbered the whole Icelandic male population. In the 
first year, several Icelanders were killed by soldiers, and many others 
became victims of violence. This came as a great shock to the non-violent 
Icelanders, who lived in a near crime-free society. Fraternization between 
soldiers and Icelandic women led to rapid increase in illegitimate births, 
prostitution, broken marriages, and domestic violence. 29 But troop-commu-
nity relations were, on the whole, more successful than most pessimists 
had predicted. Economic factors played no small role in mitigating the 
social and cultural tensions generated by the military presence. Consistent 
with the Defense Treaty, the United States provided Iceland not only with 
its total imports needs but also committed itself to buying Iceland's fish 
exports as part of the Lend-Lease agreement with Britain. The economic 
consequences were startling: in 1939, Iceland was the poorest country in 
Northern Europe, but in 1945, it had become one of the richest on a per 
capita basis." 
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The Controversy over U.S. Military 
Rights, 1 945-1 946 
Following the entry ofthe United States into the war at the end of I941, 
the strategic value oflceland became increasingly clear. Having completed, 
in 1942, the construction of a large airfield-the Keflavik Airport-near the 
capital, Reykjavik, the Americans used it to ferry thousands of bombers 
and fighters to the European !heater. In addition, the U.S. military presence 
played a vital role in Allied submarine operations in the North Atlantic and 
in keeping open the sea lanes to Britain and the Soviet Union." Given this 
strategic certainty, it was not surprising that the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) should already in 1942 have broached the possibility of acquiring 
permanent military rights in Iceland. To them, rapid advances in aircraft 
technology and the Polar route made it imperative to extend U.S. defense 
parameters to Iceland. The legal justification for such an arrangement 
could be based on Roosevelt's «Four Policemen» idea of a security system 
under the aegis of the United Nations.32 Future Soviet capability oflaunch-
ing air strikes against the United States via the Polar route could provide the 
rationale for it. Although American military planners did not initially focus 
on the Soviet Union they came to see it as the preponderant threat at the 
end of World War 11." 
The Icelandic Government was well aware of the U.S. desire to main-
tain a military presence in Iceland after the war. 34 There were, however, 
two important obstacles to any deal-the national independence question 
and the growth of the Socialist Party. Following the German occupation of 
Denmark in I 940, the National Unity Government had promised to sever 
the remaining constitutional ties with Denmark. Instead of being a 
sovereign state within the Danish Kingdom, Iceland would become a 
republic. The Roosvelt Administration managed to persuade the Icelanders 
to postpone this action until I 944 in an exchange for a pledge to recognize 
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the new republic. What it failed to foresee, however, was that the inde-
pendence question led to a nationalistic revival that greatly strengthened 
neutralist sentiments in Iceland. Indeed, by 1944, no Icelandic politician 
could openly c~mmit himself to the continuing presence of foreign troops 
on Icelandic soil. 
Coinciding with the emergence of nationalism as a major political force 
was the rapid growth of the Socialist Unity Party. Founded in 1938 after 
the merger of the Communist Party and left-wing Social Democratic 
splinter group, it had been isolated in Icelandic politics before the formation 
of the anti-Hitler coalition. Most of the Social Democratic elements left the 
party in 1940 because of the refusal of the Communists to condemn the 
Soviet invasion of Finland in 1940. But with the wartime collaboration of 
Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, the Socialist Party received respectability 
that quickly translated into electoral support. In 1942, the party received 
almost 20%, more than doubling the strength of the Communist Party in 
the 1937 elections." More important, the Socialists effectively used their 
newfound strength within the trade union movement, where they, in 
conjunction with the center-right Independent Party, successfully 
challenged the dominance of the Social Democratic Party. In 1944, they 
scored their biggest victory by taking control of the board of the all-
powerful Icelandic Federation of Labor. What provided them with 
additional political leverage was a personal feud between 6Iafur Thors and 
Hermann J6nasson-the leaders of the Independent Party and Progressive 
Party, respectively. Because of their differences, the two largest parties in 
Iceland were unwilling to form a coalition government. 36 Initially, the 
Governor oflceland, Sveinn Bjllrnsson, resolved the government crisis, in 
1942, by appointing an extra-parliamentary Government of Experts. But in 
1944, the Independence Party and the Social Democratic Party agreed to 
form a new coalition government, the so-called Innovation Government, 
with the participation of the Socialist Party. 
Before the formation of the Innovation Government, the Roosevelt 
Administration had intended to discuss postwar military requirements with 
the newly elected President, Sveinn B jllrnsson, during his official visit to 
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Washington in 1944. But the President and the Foreign Minister of the 
Government of Experts, Vilhjalmur Th6r, were forced to remove this item 
from the agenda after encountering strong opposition from the leaders of 
the political parties, who claimed that the two had no mandate to discuss 
postwar defense without parliamentary approval." Socialist participation in 
the Innovation Government made it more difficult for the United States to 
achieve its goal of securing a permanent military foothold in Iceland. Since 
the government was formed to carry out an ambitious economic program, 
it had no desire to revive the defense issue. While the Independents and 
Social Democrats would have been willing to discuss the continuation of 
the U.S. military presence in Iceland, the Socialists were adamantly op-
posed to it. 
Brushing aside all such considerations, the U.S. Ambassador in Iceland, 
Louis Dreyfus brought up the subject oflong-term military rights with the 
Icelandic Prime Minister, 6Iafur Thors, for the first time in April 1945. 
Thors reacted negatively, arguing that if the Icelandic Government would 
enter into negotiations on a base lease, it would trigger its downfall because 
of the opposition of the Socialists. He wanted to postpone any discussion 
of the issue until the general elections in 1946 to enable the government to 
implement its economic program. While the Prime Minister did not rule out 
the possibility of a base lease in the future, he made it clear that it would 
depend on two things: Soviet conduct and Icelandic UN obligations." 
The Truman Administration, it turned out, was divided on whether it 
should pursue the matter. On the one hand, many State Department and ' 
War Department officials wanted to ignore Thors's warnings and press 
ahead for a long term lease. Since the U.S.-Icelandic Defense Treaty of 
1941 stipulated that the Americans withdraw their troops from Iceland at 
the conclusion of the «present war,» they calculated that domestic political 
pressure could force them to do so after the end of the war in Asia. 39 On 
the other hand, there were elements within the U.S. Air Force that believed 
that continued U.S. military presence in Iceland would antagonize the 
Soviets and raise suspicions about Anglo-American intentions. They argued 
that the UN should make the final decision on the security arrangements 
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for Iceland." Finally, a third group-encompassing both State and War 
Department' officials--wanted to offer the Soviets a quid pro quo: the Red 
Army would be allowed to establish permanent military bases on the 
Danish island ofBornholm and on the Norwegian enclave of Spitzbergen in 
exchange for U.S. military rights in Iceland.41 
The internal debate ended abruptly in late August 1945, when the 
Truman Administration decided to ask for a long term lease of three bases 
in the area surrounding Reykjavik. This move, on October I, not only 
threatened to deplete the reserves of Icelandic goodwill toward the Ameri-
cans but also put into question the viability of the Innovation Government.42 
6lafur Thors was sharply critical of the timing and was in no doubt about 
the consequences: the Socialists would not only leave the government but 
also try to exploit the issue by staging political strikes and by engaging in 
other forms of economic warfare.43 The Americans knew, of course, that 
they would face criticism in Iceland for their handling of the issue. But 
they erroneously feared that the Icelandic Government would insist on the 
withdrawal ofU.S. forces after the surrender of the Japanese. 
Thors and other pro-Western politicians worried little about the strict 
letter of the U.S.-Icelandic Defense Treaty. To them, the Americans could 
stay in Iceland until the UN Security Council decided on the security 
arrangements of the member states. Besides, since the application of the 
Icelandic Government for UN membership had been delayed because of its 
refusal to declare war on the Axis--a precondition for a founding member-
ship--no Icelandic political party, save for the Socialists, wanted the small 
U.S. force that remained in Iceland to be withdrawn.44 What Thors did not 
know, however, was that the Truman Administration was bent on securing 
military rights in Iceland before the UN Security Council was formed, 
because it would be able to veto bilateral security agreements. 
When the U.S. base request ran into trouble in Iceland, Ambassador 
Dreyfus, blamed 6lafur Thors, labeling him an «opportunist,» whose only 
goal was to stay in power." But it was not only Thors, who was miffed by 
the way the Americans handled the base issue. Aside from the Soviets, 
who did not conceal their displeasure,46 British Foreign Secretary, Ernes! 
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Bevin, was opposed to a long-term base lease for several reasons. For one 
thing, it could undermine one of Bevin 's cherished goals--namely, the 
establishment of the United Nations as a global security organization. 
Secondly, he feared that the Soviets would demand bases in Bornholm or 
other Scandinavian territories in exchange for approving a U.S. military 
presence in Iceland. To Bevin, a preferable course of action was a short-
term U.S. base lease that would expire once the UN security mechanisms 
were in place and Iceland had become a member of the world body. There 
was certainly more self-interest behind the British position than met the 
eye: the British JCS considered it imperative to have military access to 
Iceland in wartime, especially in the contingency of American non-partici-
pation. In March 1945, they had called for joint U.K.-U.S. military rights in 
Iceland. But having no desire to share Iceland with other powers, the 
Truman Administration did not respond to the proposal until nine months 
later. Despite the snub, the British signalled their willingness to make a 
compromise with the Americans: to accept long-term U.S. military rights in 
Iceland in exchange for landing rights in wartime. When Washington 
decided against it on the rather tenuous grounds that it would be discrimi-
natory vis-a-vis other nations, London decided to stay on the side lines on 
the base issue. This policy of calculated passivity did much to undermine 
the U.S. case in Iceland." 
The base request put 6lafur Thors in a difficult position: on the one 
hand, he knew that the days of his government would be numbered, if it 
would be granted. On the other, he wanted to maintain friendly relations 
with the United States, not least because of its constructive role in resolv-
ing the independence question and its economic support during the war. To 
keep his coalition government intact, Thors tried to put on a delicate 
balancing act designed to satisfY both the Icelandic Socialists and the 
Americans. He sought to prolong the American military presence by 
postponing Iceland's entry into the UN. Of course, this was only a tempo-
rary solution, but he hoped that both sides would accept it for the time 
being. The Socialists showed some flexibility by agreeing to preliminary 
talks with the United States with no strings attached. But they reiterated 
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their intention ofleaving the government, if the U.S. received military rights 
in Iceland. 48 The Truman Administration was in no mood for engaging in 
talks with no fixed agenda. To the Americans, the issue boiled down to an 
easy proposition: the Icelandic Government could either accept the base 
lease request or reject it. There was no middle ground-no room for 
maneuvering. When Thors received this message, he shot back in a fit of 
exasperation: «This answer could have been written in Moscow.»49 
One important reason for the hard-line position of the Americans was 
their reliance on information from Icelandic politicians with self-serving 
motives. The pro-American Vilhjalmur Th6r, the former Foreign Minister, 
and J6nas J6nsson, a dissident former head of the Progressive Party, used 
the base issue not only to further their goal of establishing closer defense 
and economic ties between Iceland and the United States but also of 
forming a center-right coalition government between the Independence 
Party and the Progressive Party. 50 To be sure, there were many other 
Icelandic politicians, who were in favor of granting the Americans base 
rights in Iceland in return for political and economic concessions." But 
they were reluctant to say so publicly, fearing a domestic political backlash. 
Icelandic intellectuals were, for example, very vocal and active in their 
opposition to any defense links with the United States. Enjoying a very high 
social standing and exerting much influence on public opinion, the intellec-
tuals argued that the U.S. military presence had a corrupting influence on 
Icelandic culture and national identity. There were also elements within the 
Independence Party, Progressive Party, and the Social Democratic Party 
that were against it on nationalistic grounds. Finally, the negative attitude of 
British, Danes, Norwegian and Swedes--the nations with whom the 
Icelanders identified most closely-ensured that no parliamentary majority 
would be s.ecured for base rights on a long term basis. 52 
In the middle of October 1945, Olafur Thors formally submitted his 
compromise formula to the Americans. He suggested that the two govern-
ments enter into preliminary talks with no special agenda. In an oral 
elaboration, Thors made it clear, though, that his coalition partuers--the 
Socialists and Social Democrats-interpreted his message as a rejection of 
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the U.S. request. Oddly enough, Dreyfus interpreted the Icelandic note as a 
positive answer to the American base request. The written note, to be sure, 
was hopelessly ambiguous. It broached unspecified future military de-
mands imposed on Iceland by the UN and failed to mention the real issue: 
the base lease. But the oral qualifications should be have left the Ambassa-
dor in no doubt about the negative position of the government." 
Dreyfus 's misinterpretation was mostly due to his overreliance on the 
advice ofVilhjalmur Th6r, whom the Ambassador termed <<America's best 
friend in Iceland.» Without any hesitation, Th6r told Dreyfus that the note 
was the «Icelandic way>> of saying yes to the U.S. request. 54 When Olafur 
Thors learned of this false interpretation, he hardened his position, telling 
Dreyfus that the only option available was to prolong the U.S. military 
presence until the UN security mechanisms were operational." News leal<s 
of the American request quickly strengthened the hand of the Icelandic 
nationalists, who began to organize in opposition to U.S. military bases in 
peacetime. Under the leadership of prominent Icelandic intellectuals--
Communists, such as the future No bel Prize winner in literature, Halld6r 
Laxness, and non-Communists alike--this became a formidable movement 
in its own right. Even members of the Prime Minister's own party, the 
Independence Party, spoke out publicly against the U.S. request. 56 By the 
middle of November 1945, it was clear that no Icelandic politician, except . 
for such mavericks as J6nas J6nsson, could lend his or her support to 
foreign military bases on Icelandic soil. 
It was not until the Icelandic Ambassador to Washington, Thor Thors--
the brother of Olafur Thors--managed to convince State Department 
officials of the hopelessness of the situation that the Americans backed 
down and decided to put their request on hold in December 1945.57 In the 
first half of 1946, Icelandic politicians of all stripes advised the Americans 
to refrain from any overtures on the base question until after the elections 
in the summer. Otherwise, the Socialists could exploit the issue in the 
election campaign by whipping up anti-American sentiment and harping on 
nationalistic themes. 58 
Three additional developments in the spring of 1946 further undermined 
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the American cause. First, the British unilaterally decided to close down 
their small garrison in Iceland that had run the Reykjavik Airport since the 
war. Secondly, the Soviets began the withdrawal of their military forces 
from Bornholm-a move that pulled the rug from under those Icelanders 
who had been in favor of granting the United States bases as a 
counterweight to the Soviet military presence in Scandinavia. Finally, the 
U.S. Minister of Commerce and former Vice President, Henry Wallace, 
who was a prominent member of the left-wing of the Democratic Party, 
added insult to injury by publicly calling for the removal ofU.S. troops 
from Iceland." 
Despite all these warning signs, the State Department decided to renew 
the base issue in April 1946. The Icelandic Prime Minister reacted with 
indignation, reiterating all the familiar arguments against it. 6lafur Thors 
even recommended that the Truman Administration formally withdraw the 
base request to eliminate it from the political agenda, because it would 
never be accepted in its present form.60 This harsh reaction ultimately 
convinced the Truman Administration that it would have to make conces-
sions to get any agreement. Instead of a long-term base lease, the Ameri-
cans decided to ask for landing rights for military aircraft in connection 
with their occupation duties in Germany. This was, of course, a far more 
modest request. And although Thors refused to discuss it before the 
elections, he thought a compromise could be reached along these lines." 
The election results showed strong popular support for the Innovation 
Government. The Independent Party received about 40% of the vote, the 
Socialist Party 20%, and the Social Democratic Party 18%. The opposi-
tion, the Progressive Party, was the only party that suffered a marked 
decline in its electoral strength from 26,5% to 23%.62 But, while the 
coalition partners were eager to renew their government cooperation, there 
was bound to be one obstacle: the base request. The Socialists were still 
adamantly against any concessions to the Americans on this issue. More-
over, 6lafur Thors's legal argument for maintaining the U.S. military 
presence had been dealt a blow during the summer of 1946, when 
international legal experts came to the conclusion that UN members had no 
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obligation to provide military facilities in peacetime. Yet, Thors decided to 
enter, on his own initiative, into private talks with an American envoy, Hugh 
cumming, the head of the Northern European section of the State . 
Department, about the American proposal for landing rights. The two Sides 
quickly agreed on the withdrawal of the U.S. mili~ forces from ~celand 
in exchange for landing rights for 6'/2 years. In addition, the Amencans 
would run the Keflavik Airport and finance its operations. Thors was now 
confronted with the dual problem ofsecuring parliamentary approval of the 
Keflavik Agreement and of keeping his government coalition intact. It was 
an undertaking that proved to be too difficult----even for Thors, one of 
Iceland's shrewdest politicians. He received parliamentary majority for the 
deal, but failed to persuade the Socialists to stay in the government. All the 
MPs of the Independence Party and the Social Democratic Party voted for 
the agreement, except for two members of the left-wing of the latter. The 
Progressive Party split right down the middle on the issue. The party 
chairman, former Prime Minister, Hennann J6nasson and a group of 
supporters voted against the Keflavik Agreement, but another group 
identified with the party's right-wing backed it.63 
The Keflavik Agreement deeply polarized Icelandic society. During the 
A/thing debate, Socialist, nationalist, and neutralist elements organized 
protest meetings in Reykjavik, attacking the treaty for infringing Iceland's 
sovereignty. 6lafur Thors and other prominent leaders of the Independence 
Party were also attacked by an angry mob in what proved to be the most 
serious disturbances since the founding of the Icelandic republic. The 
Socialist Party took the most extreme position, accusing the architects of 
the agreement of treason by placing the fate of the country in the hands of 
«American imperialists.» Other opponents from the Progressive Party and 
the Social Democratic Party found fault with specific clauses of the 
agreement, especially the one granting the Americans exclusive rights to 
run Keflavik Airport.64 
The first argument had no basis, because the Keflavik Agreement was 
ratified by A/thing. The other was more justified: it raised legitimate 
concerns about jurisdictional issues at the Keflavik Airport. What it failed to 
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recognize, however, was that the Icelanders were unable to run the 
Keflavik Airport because of a lack of technical training and financial 
resources. It maY; be argued that the Keflavik Agreement amounted to an 
admission that Iceland was within the U.S. sphere of influence. Indeed, it 
represented the first step toward active political cooperation with the 
United States in the postwar period. But it neither provided the United 
States with permanent military rights nor constituted a defense treaty: 
military aircmft were permitted to make stopovers on their way to Europe, 
but no ground troops were stationed in Iceland. 
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A Reluctant Commitment: Iceland Joins 
NATO, 1948-1949 
Following the downfall of the Innovation Government, Iceland experienced 
a long political crisis. It was not resolved until February 1947, when the 
chairman of the Social Democmtic Party, Stefan J6hann Stefansson, 
succeeded in forming a coalition government consisting of the Social 
Democmtic Party, the Independence Party, and the Progressive Party." 
Together with the Prime Minister, the most important figures in the new 
government were the Foreign Minister, Bjami Benediktsson, the Mayor of 
Reylgavik and 6Iafur Thors 's right hand man, and the Minister of Culture 
and Transportation, Eysteinn J6nsson. Despite a huge parliamentary 
majority, the new government proved to be weak. It was not only because 
of the preponderant influence of the opposition Socialist Party within the 
trade union movement but also because of the refusal of 6Iafur Thors and 
Hermann J6nasson to set aside their personal differences and join it. 
The government was decidedly pro-Western and turned into an anti-
Communist bulwark with the emergence of the Cold War. Still, ideological 
solidarity-anti-Communism-had little do with its formation. The Ameri-
cans, in conjunction with such Icelandic anti-Communists as Vilhj ahnur 
Th6r, had surely tried behind the scenes to keep the Socialists out of the 
government. But 6Iafur Thors, who had established close personal rela-
tionships with the leaders of the Socialist Party-Einar Olgeirsson and 
Brynj6lfur Bjamason-wanted to include them in a coalition government if 
they abandoned their demand for the repudiation of the Keflavik Agree-
ment.66 When the Socialists rejected this condition, they condemned 
themselves to a 10-year period of isolation in Icelandic politics. 
Icelandic party leaders-with the exception of the Socialists-wanted 
to maintain good relations with the United States. Like other Western 
European leaders, they had reservations about the harsher features of 
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American capitalism and were much more inclined to favor state interven-
tion in the economy. Traditionally, Icelandic cabinet ministers and politi-
cians had more intimate contacts with their European and Scandinavian 
counterparts. But they had much respect for the political and economic 
might of the United States and shared its opposition to Soviet Communism. 
From 1947 to 1949, they established close relations with the Americans in 
the struggle against the Socialist Party, partly because of ideological affinity 
and partly because of a perceived political necessity in their efforts to stave 
off Socialist attacks. 
In 1947-1948, the political forces that coalesced in opposition to the 
Keflavik Agreement continued to contest its validity and to question its 
enforcement. Although the agreement yielded clear economic benefits, it 
was never popular. The Socialists skillfully used nationalistic arguments 
against it and uncovered instances of smuggJ.ing and black market activities 
to' support their case. The Icelandic Government was also dissatisfied with 
certain U.S. interpretations of the agreement, especially with respect to 
operational costs." But during this period, the Icelanders were more 
concerned about the deteriorating economic situation than about the 
Keflavik Agreement or security issues in general. It was not until the 
Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia in February 1948-
coupled with the Berlin Blockade-that the Icelandic government began to 
look for ways to strengthen the defense oflceland by translating the 
Keflavik Agreement into a bilateral defense treaty. 
Like in Western Europe, the Czech coup raised deep suspicions in 
Iceland about the Socialist Party and its ties with the Soviet Union. Since 
the Icelandic police force consisted of only I 00 officers, Foreign Minister 
Bjarni Benediktsson of the Independence Party and Premier Stefan J6hann 
Stefansson of the Social Democratic Party wanted to create militias within 
their respective parties to counter possible Socialist subversion. The 
Americans offered both encouragement and military support. 68 But 
Icelandic political leaders eventually balked at the idea, probably because 
the events in Czechoslovakia did not result in similar Communist moves in 
Western Europe. True, the Independence Party formed an unarmed militia 
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in 1949, but on a much smaller scale than originally envisioned. Plans to 
reduce the influence of the Socialists in government were also diluted. 
Hampered by laws guaranteeing civil service protection, the Icelandic 
Government made little use of its power to remove persons from sensitive 
posts. 69 There were several examples of such practices, but no comparison 
is warranted to the McCarthyist witchhunts that were to grip the United 
States in the early 1950s. The Czech coup not only raised concerns about 
internal security but also about the defenselessness of Iceland against 
external attack. In view of the strategic importance of Iceland, the 
Icelandic Government knew that the United States would hardly stand idly 
by in the case of an attack. But since the Keflavik Agreement provided no 
security guarantee, it could not count on U.S. intervention. On his own 
initiative, Premier Stefansson suggested, in the spring of 1948, that a secret 
understanding be reached with the United States on the defense oflceland. 
Together with Benediktsson and Eysteinn J6nsson of the Progressive Party, 
he sought a security guarantee without turning the Keflavik Airport into a 
military base in peacetime. During the summer of 1948, Benediktsson also 
made overtures on behalf of the cabinet to the Americans, broaching the 
possibility of using the Keflavik Agreement as a defense treaty. The imme-
diate concern was not the Czech coup, but the presence of a large Soviet 
fishing fleet off the North coast of Iceland. Benediktsson did not rule out 
that the fishing crews were a disguised military force, whose real aim was 
to occupy Iceland in cooperation with the «fifth column>>--the Icelandic 
Socialists. 70 The Americans did not think that the Soviets had such inten-
tions. But because of their own military interest in Iceland, they appreciated 
the growing awareness of the defenselessness of the island. 
In mid-1948, the Truman Administration had no contingency plans for 
the defense oflceland. But while discounting possible Soviet aggressive 
designs, it was intent on capturing Iceland as soon as possible after the 
outbreak of war. The reason was simple: U.S. war plans relied heavily on 
the retaliatory power of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) in the case of a 
Soviet invasion of Europe. U.S. nuclear monopoly-particularly SAC's 
offensive capability-was not only seen as the most effective deterrent 
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against such a contingency. Considering Soviet superiority in conventional 
weapons, U .S military planners had ruled out the feasibility of defending 
Europe in favor of counterattacks against the Soviet Union from bases in 
other countries, especially Britain, the Middle East, and North Africa. If 
SAC bases in Britain were destroyed by the Soviets, the Americans planned 
to proceed with the counteroffensive from Iceland. Hence, the need to 
ensure access to' Iceland for medium range bombers. 
The early military plans were surely sketchy at best and grossly defi-
cient at worst. Initially, the United States overestimated its own nuclear 
capability and the readiness of SAC-a problem confounded by internal 
criticisms of the reliance on retaliatory nuclear strikes. The highly secret 
Pentagon discussions in the spring of 1948 between top American, British, 
and Canadian military officials sought to address it by focusing on ways to 
reduce the vulnerability of Europe to a Soviet attack and devise a formula 
for the defense of the Continent. But since these plans were only in their 
early stages, the Americans felt that they had to continue to rely on their 
nuclear retaliatory capability. 71 Having been unsuccessful in 1946, to 
establish military bases in Iceland in peacetime, the Truman Administration 
decided, in 1948, to press for the lengthening of the runways at the 
Keflavik Airport for SAC use in wartime. Because of the offensive conno-
tations of the project, the initial reaction of the Icelandic Government was 
negative. But bowing to,strong American pressure, it relented in early 1949 
and approved the lengthening of one runway. 72 
This episode reflects the dilemma faced by the Icelandic Government: it 
wanted to strengthen the defense of Iceland without making it a launching 
pad for offensive operations against the Soviet Union. To resolve it, the 
cabinet ministers groped for a middle ground. At an important meeting with 
U.S. Ambassador, Richard Butrick, in August 1948, Foreign Minister 
Benediktsson made it clear that the United States would need Icelandic 
approval for the use of!celand in wartime. To do otherwise would consti-
tute a gross violation of the Keflavik Agreement as well as international law. 
Having said that, however, Benediktsson added that the Americans could 
interpret the Keflavik Agreement liberally by having «sufficient planes and 
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even soldiers lay over at Keflavik.» The government wanted to make sure 
that the United States would be ahead of the Soviet Union in the competi-
tion for Iceland in wartime. Judging by their experience in World War 11, 
the Icelanders knew, of course, that there was a distinct possibility that the 
United States would capture Iceland in the event of war-with or without 
their consent. Indeed, that was exactly what the Americans planned to do. 
But Benediktsson wanted to make it clear that consultation and cooperation 
were in the interest of both countries. 73 
The Icelandic Government was not prepared to take any further steps 
toward formal military arrangements with the United States. Domestic 
political constraints-nationalistic sensitivity on the defense question 
coupled with a lack of a military tradition--forced cabinet ministers to 
proceed with caution and restraint. This also explains why the Icelandic 
Government insisted that the initiative to enter into negotiations on the 
formation of NATO in late 1948 come from the Western Europeans and the 
Americans. A key rationale for U.S. participation in «entangling alliances» 
was the prospective military access to «stepping stone countries» like 
Iceland, the Azores and Greenland. 74 Therefore, it did not come as a 
surprise, when in January 1949 the Icelandic Government received a 
formal invitation to join the talks. 75 Before committing itself, the govern-
ment had to overcome several hurdles. The most important one was a 
disagreement over the preconditions for NATO membership. The leaders of 
the Independence Party and the Social Democratic Party were receptive to 
the idea of allowing a small military contingent to be stationed in Iceland 
for the protection of the airfield at Keflavik. The Progressive Party leader, 
Eysteinn J6nsson, was, however, opposed to any peacetime military 
presence. 76 It reflected his reluctance to enhance the military value of 
Iceland and to prevent a split within the Progressive Party on the issue. 
Another complicating factor was the uncertainty about the creation of a 
Scandinavian Defense Union. Without the participation of Denmark and, 
especially, Norway in the prospective North Atlantic Alliance, the Icelandic 
government would probably not have opted for membership. n Finally, the 
cabinet ministers had to take into account domestic political opposition to 
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any Icelandic participation in a military alliance. Already in December, 
the same,political forces that came together to oppose the Keflavik 
Agreement had begun agitating against the prospective involvement of 
Iceland in the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) talks. 78 Like in 1946, this 
mov,ement was divided into two segments: on the one hand, there were 
non-Communist nationalistic and neutralist elements. Prominent among 
those were members of the left-wing of the Social Democratic Party 
and Progressive Party. On the other hand, there were the Socialists, 
who used both nationalistic as well as anti-American propaganda in 
their campaign against NAT. 
Initially, it was far from clear whether the government would be 
able to overcome these hurdles. To be sure, the failure of the 
Scandinavian Defense Union-and the subsequent Norwegian and 
Danish decisions to join the NAT talks in March-increased the 
chances oflcelandic participation. 79 But continued internal squabbles 
almost led to the downfall of the government in February. 80 In the end, 
the coalition partners agreed on a formula to resolve their differences: 
as a precondition for Iceland's NATO membership, there would be no 
military presence in peacetime. The Americans were perfectly willing 
to accept this solution. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, even stated 
disingenuously that the United States did not want have a military force 
in Iceland." Of course, the Americans had not abandoned their interest 
in negotiating a base agreement with the Icelanders, but they realized 
that they could not get more at this stage. 
Following intensive discussions between an Icelandic delegation-
composed of Benediktsson, Eysteinn J6nsson, and Emit J6nsson, an 
influential Social Democratic politician-and Acheson and State De-
partment and Defense Department officials in Washington, the 
Icelandic Government decided to join NATO at the end of March. 82 
This move evoked strong nationalistic and Socialist protests that 
culminated in the most serious postwar riots in Iceland. The A/thing 
building was stoned and government ministers were attacked by 
protesters. The riots did not prevent the A/thing from approving NAT 
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with overwhelming support: 37 were in favor and 13 against. It is 
ironip, however, that Iceland-which had made its unarmed tradition 
the precondition for joining NATO---should have witnessed the most 
serious disturbances. 83 
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«Empire by Invitation»: The Korean War 
and the Reentry of U.S. Troops, 1951 
Before Iceland's entry into NATO, the United States had been looking for 
ways to address the Icelandic Government's security concerns. Bjami 
Benediktsson's suggestion that the United States interpret the Keflavik 
Agreement by keeping military aircraft permanently stationed in Iceland 
received much attention within the Department of Defense. While 
Benediktsson calculated that by maintaining a visible military presence in 
Iceland, the United States would deter the Socialists from attempting a 
coup, he was mainly concerned about the potential Soviet threat: U.S. 
military officials, however, believed that the Socialist capability of seizing 
power posed a more immediate threat than a Soviet invasion. Thus James 
Forrestal, the Secretary of Defense, ordered contingency plans, in late 
1948, for the capture of Iceland in the event of a Communist coup d' etat. 
A plan developed by the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic 
(CINCLANT) to deal with such a contingency was first discussed at a 
National Security Council meeting in April 1949. Pentagon officials reiter-
ated on the basis of comments made by Benediktsson during the NAT talks 
that the possibility of a Communist coup was the most serious danger 
facing Iceland. 84 The Icelandic Foreign Minister had, in fact, never inti-
mated that the internal threat was more important than the external one, 
even though he was in favor of establishing a Home Guard to protect the 
airport against potential subversion. State Department officials did not 
believe that the Soviets intended to seize power in Iceland by proxy-
through the Socialist Party-and attached far more importance to finding a 
political than a military solution to the problem oflceland's internal 
security. Moreover, they questioned the value of a unilateral U.S. military 
intervention in the event of a Socialist coup, preferring instead to deal with 
the crisis on a multilateral basis through NATO." 
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In an effort to bridge the differences between the State and Defense 
Departments, the NSC approved a compromise in the summer of 1949. 
The Pentagon was entrusted with the task of preparing contingency plans 
for sending a U.S. military force to Iceland to protect U.S. and NATO 
interests in the event of a Communist coup. The State Department was 
instructed to make plans to prevent the Communists from seizing power by 
political means. This compromise did not solve the basic contradiction 
embedded in this policy: on the one hand, the policy paper argued along 
Pentagon lines that the internal danger was the most acute problem facing 
Iceland. On the other, it seconded the State Department view that the 
possibility of a Communist coup was remote.86 
Nonetheless, CINCLANT'S contingency plans for quashing a Socialist 
coup were, in 1949, merged with U.S. plans to fight a war with the Soviet 
Union. The idea was to enable SAC to have access to Iceland on a standby 
basis ifU.S. bases in Britain were destroyed." What the plans failed to do, 
however, was to answer two key questions. First, what would have 
happened, if the British had denied the Americans the use of bases in 
Britain for retaliatory nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union? This ques-
tion was pertinent and never really resolved to the satisfaction of either the 
British or the Americans. Second, would the Americans have asked the 
Icelandic Government for permission to use Iceland for SAC's offensive 
operations? 
There is no evidence to suggest that the Icelandic Government was 
aware of these U.S contingency plans. Icelandic politicians paid, in fact, 
limited attention to military questions in the latter part of 1949 and early 
1950 because of a domestic political crisis. The three-party government 
broke up in the fall of 1949 over disagreements over economic policy. A 
new coalition government---i:omposed of the Independence Party and the 
Progressive Party-was not formed until February 1950.88 Earlier in the 
year, NATO had informed Icelandic officials of the need for stationing a 
small military force of 200 to protect the Keflavik Airport against sabo-
tage. 89 Without committing himself to what was bound to be a very sensi-
tive issue because oflceland's precondition for NATO's membership, 
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Benediktsson argued that if this force was, indeed, needed it should be 
composed of Icelanders, not foreigners. The Truman Administration, 
which had not given up its aim of achieving permanent military rights in 
Iceland, preferred to have U.S. or other NATO forces assume this duty 
because of the Icelandic lack of military training.00 But it did not press th.e 
defense issue, which was not revived until the North Korean invasion of 
South Korea in late June. 
Like in other European countries, the Korean War triggered a war scare 
in Iceland. Benediktsson feared that the presence of a large Soviet fishing 
fleet near Iceland~oupled with suspicious behavior of Russian diplo-
mats-was an indication of possible ulterior motives. The Americans did 
not think that the Soviets were planning to invade Iceland, but t~ calm 
Icelandic cabinet officials, they sent several destroyers to Iceland to keep 
an eye on the Soviet fleet." Although U.S. officials calculated that the 
Korean War had made the Icelandic Government more susceptible to the 
peacetime presence of military forces in Iceland, they realized that too 
much pressure could result in a nationalistic backlash. True, U.S. Ambas-
sador, Edward Lawson, used the opportunity to remind Benediktsson of 
the need for collective sacrifice in the face of a common enemy.92 But he 
did not take his case further during the summer of 1950. While the British 
agreed with the Americans on the need for strengthening Iceland's 
defenses, they preferred a multilateral approach through NATO instead of a 
unilateral U.S. one. In collusion with the Americans, the British decided to 
ask Halvard Lange, the Foreign Minister of Norway, to prod the Icelandic 
Government into ac.cepting additional defense measures. Lange was willing 
to undertake this task and promised not to reveal its real sponsors. In 
addition, the Standing Group ofNATO's Military Committee submitted a 
letter to the Icelandic Government, requesting information about its defense 
needs and intentions. 93 
By pure coincidence, the Icelandic Government had decided, on its own 
initiative, to approach NATO on defense a few hours before Lange had the 
opportunity to discuss the matter with Benediktsson. Thus Lange 's and 
NATO's overtures did not influence its decision directly. True, the Icelan-
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die Government had not agreed on permitting a foreign military presence in 
Iceland or on forming a Home Guard. But the ice had been broken: the 
stationing of a military force in peacetime was no longer a taboo.94 In a 
meeting withBenediktsson in September in Washington, the Standing 
Group pressed for the establishment of a security force of 1200 to protect 
the Keflavik Airport instead of the earlier estimate of200. Without commit-
ting himself, the Icelandic Foreign Minister requested additional information 
about such questions as stockpiling, the force size, the location of radar 
stations, air defenses, and the costs involved. Although the Icelandic 
Government was sympathetic toward the NATO request, it did not want to 
make the fmal decision until the Standing Group had provided the details of 
its defense plan." 
Despite pressure from both Dean Acheson and Bjarni Benediktsson, the 
Standing Group was unable to answer the questions of the Icelandic 
Government until January 1951, because most NATO military experts were 
in Europe during the last months of 1950 to prepare for the establishment 
ofthe Supreme Allied Headquarters in Europe (SHAPE).96 But shortly 
thereafter the Icelandic Government agreed to a NATO request to enter into 
negotiations with the United States on a defense treaty. It insisted, how-
ever, on bearing no costs of the military presence and on being able to 
revoke the treaty unilaterally on a reasonably short notice. 97 The cancella-
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tion clause proved to be the sticking point in the secret bilateral negotiations 
that began in Reykjavik in mid-February 1951. 
Since the Truman Administration was reluctant to spend vast sums of 
money on military projects in Iceland without securing a long-term corn· 
mitment, it proposed to tie the treaty's duration clause to that ,of NAT. The 
Icelandic Government, in contrast, demanded a one-year revocation clause 
as a price for abandoning Iceland's precondition for joining NATQ-the 
insistence on no peacetime military presence. In the end, the Truman 
Administration relented and accepted a «compromise» that corresponded 
closely to the Icelandic position. Either side could revoke the treaty on 18 
months notice. In addition, the North Atlantic Council was to give its 
opinion on whether it deemed such action warranted from a military point 
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of view, but it had no veto power. Another difficult issue in the negotiations 
was also resolved to the satisfaction of the Icelanders. The Americans 
wanted to double the number of troops considered necessary by the 
Standing Group {which had already raised its estimate again from 1200 to 
3,300). But for nationalistic reasons, the Icelanders succeeded in keeping a 
tight lid on the size of the force and on limiting the initial number to 
3,900.98 
When in late April, a draft defense treaty had been prepared, the nego-
tiations hit a snag. State Department officials wanted to leave out any 
special mention of the defense oflceland in the treaty and to limit its scope 
to the defense of the Nortb-Atlantic Treaty area. They feared that Congress 
would interpret the defense arrangement as exceeding the obligations set 
forth in NAT. B jarni Benediktsson adamantly refused to budge on this 
question. While acknowledging that the Americans were thinking of their 
own security and that of NATO, he made it clear that the Icelandic 
Government's motive for entering into a military relationship with the 
United States was to ensure the defense of Iceland. He even threatened to 
refuse to sign the treaty, if the United States did not abandon its position. 
When the Americans realized that the issue could scuttle the negotiations, 
they backed off and accepted the original wording. 99 
This paved the way for the signing of the Defense Treaty on May 5 and 
for the entry of the first contingent of U.S. troops--about 300 soldiers--
two days later. The government did not want to call a special session of 
A/thing, which was in recess in the spring of 1951, to vote on the agree-
ment since its legal experts had come to the conclusion that the Defense 
Treaty did involve more extensive obligations than those ofNAT. But to 
bolster its case, it acquired the written consent of a large majority of MPs, 
including the opposition Social Democratic Party. 
The U.S.-Icelandic Defense Treaty and the arrival of U.S. troops in 
Iceland aroused much international attention. The American press generally 
welcomed the news, referring to the unstable international situation.'"" The 
official Soviet press castigated the treaty as a blatant example of American 
imperialism-a culmination of systematic attempts to subjugate the Icelan-
36 
DEFENCE STUDIES :N'1999 
die people through the Marshall Plan and NAT0. 101 The Icelandic Socialists 
reacted in a similar way, accusing the government of committing treason 
like in 1946.102 But the opposition to the treaty proved to be much weaker 
than to the KeflavikAgreement or to Iceland's NATO membership. The 
coalescence of nationalistic, neutralist, and Socialist forces never material-
ized this time, because members of the left-wing of the Progressive Party 
and the Social Democratic Party voted in favor of the Defense Treaty. The 
reason for this rare display of unity on foreign policy can be traced to the 
impact of the Korean War on the domestic political situation. By blaming 
the West for instigating the hostilities in Asia, the Icelandic Socialists 
isolated themselves politically and became more closely associated with 
Moscow. To be sure, the opponents of the agreement had one powerful 
argument at their disposal. The Defense Treaty was broader in scope than 
NAT: 1• 3 it entrusted the Americans exclusively with the defense oflceland 
without spelling out how it would be used in war. According to Article 5 of 
NAT, member countries could decide, on their own, on their response to an 
armed aggression against one of them. The Socialists and nationalists also 
made the point that the U.S. military presence contradicted Iceland's 
precondition for NATO membership. The government defended itself by 
arguing that the treaty was <<made on the basis>> ofNAT and that it had 
received a written approval of the majority of MPs. Moreover, it had issued 
a temporary executive decree, legalizing the Defense Treaty three weeks 
after the entry ofU.S. troops. Undoubtedly, the government would have 
strengthened its political case by putting the treaty before the parliament 
earlier. But when the A/thing approved it in the fall, it also removed the 
procedural ambiguities. 
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The Impact of the U.S. Military Pres-
ence, 1951-1955 
. Compared to the passionate public debate over the Keflavik Agreement and 
NATO, the reaction to the entry of American troops-soon-to-be called the 
Iceland Defense Force-was strangely anti-climatic. Most Icelanders 
greeted th_e _ne':s with ~ixed feelings. To them, the Defense Treaty was a 
result of nsmg mternational tensions, perhaps a necessity but not an 
occ~ion f~r celebration. There was no desire to experience again the 
soctal tenswns generated by the U.S. presence during World War rr. The 
Americans had, of course, first-hand knowledge of Icelandic nationalism-
both in its dormant and eruptive state. But they were relatively slow to 
grasp the significance to which many Icelanders attached to the fraterniza-
tion issue. Although the American soldiers were in no way a threat to the 
Icelandic social and moral fabric, as some nationalists claimed their 
presence in bars and restaurants in Reykjavik sparked local re;entment. 
This si~a~ion was made worse by a display of open hostility on the part of 
the ~o~taltsts. As a result, the Icelandic Government decided to put some 
restrictwns on the movement on U.S. troops in Iceland. It was a move that 
did not sit well with the U.S. soldiers, but it was clearly in the interest of 
both sides.'04 Apart from protecting the Keflavik Airport, U.S. forces in 
Iceland facilitated air and naval patrol in this strategic area. With an im-
proved Distant Early Earning system, the Americans wanted to be in a 
positio~ to react more effectively to a surprise Soviet attack on Iceland or 
the Umted States. In the case of a Soviet invasion, a small contingent of 
~Y troops were meant to hold the country as long as possible-or until 
ret~force~ents arrived. In wartime, the mission of the fighter planes 
stattoned m Iceland was to defend Iceland and destroy Soviet bombers 
enroute to America."' 
One of the questions raised by the Defense Treaty was the use of 
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Iceland in wartime. The Socialists had argued that it would be a launching 
ad for strategic attacks on the Soviet Union as part of America's «aggres-~ive war plans.» The Icelandic Government denied the charges, arguing 
that the Iceland Defense Force main mission was to defend Iceland and 
other North Atlantic security interests. But statements made by American 
military officials and Congressmen about the importance of Iceland for 
SAC harmed the government's case. In the fall of 1951, a U.S. Senator, 
called on the Truman Administration to move American nuclear weapons 
from Britain to bases in Iceland, Turkey, and North Africa. When the 
Socialists demanded an official explanation, Bjarni Benediktsson asked the 
Americans to make it clear that they had no such intentions. The State 
Department. recommended that Benediktsson be informed in strictest 
confidence that the U.S. was not planning to store atomic weapons in 
Iceland. The Department of Defense was, however, reluctant to be so 
specific, because it was working on plans to establish ~ strategic air base in 
Iceland. In the end a compromise was reached: Benediktsson was told that 
the United States would not do anything that violated the letter and spirit of 
the Defense Treaty. All military projects involving Iceland would be pre-
sented to the Icelandic Government for approval.'06 
The Air Force was eager to expand its military rights in Iceland by 
constructing an additional airfield at Rangarvel/ir in the Southern part of 
the country. SAC would use this airfield to support a heavy strategic 
mission in wartime and for training purpose in peacetime. The request 
reflected lingering doubts of many U.S. military officers about the ultimate 
control of SAC bases on British soil. Winston Churchill and Harry S. 
Truman had made an ambiguous oral agreement that provided for a joint 
decision on the use of nuclear weapons stored in Britain. To be sure, the 
SAC bases in Britain and North Africa would remain the most important 
ones for the counteroffensive. But in the case of a conflict with the British 
on the question of the use of SAC base, the Americans wanted to have 
access to Iceland.107 
Benediktsson's first reaction to the U.S. request was one of skepticism: 
a government approval would depend on whether it interpreted the project 
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as a contribution to the defense of Iceland. U.S. Ambassador, Lawson, 
assured Benediktsson of the exclusively defensive use of the airfield--a 
suspect argument because it failed to take into account the offensive role 
of SAC. But in early 1953, a Norwegian General, who had been asked by 
the Icelandic Government to give a third opinion on the American request, 
recommended the approval of the Rangtirvellir project. To him, it would 
be better to have two airfields instead of one. If the Keflavik Airport would 
become the target of Soviet attacks, retaliatory strikes could be launched 
from the other one. "13 What he failed to stress was that the new airfield 
served offensive as well as defensive purposes. This raises the question of 
whether the General was, in fact, neutral. 
The Icelandic Government wanted to make the additional military 
facilities conditional on U.S. support for diversifying Iceland's economy. 
State Department officials were reluctant to make such an obvious link 
between the military and economic questions, fearing that it would set a 
bad precedent. After all, Iceland, which had profited tremendously in 
material terms from World War 11, had received more Marshall Aid than 
any other country on a per capita basis. But Defense officials wanted to 
grant the Icelandic wish to facilitate acceptance of the base request. Before 
the issue was resolved, the Icelandic Government decided to postpone any 
negotiations on the new airfield for domestic political reasons--the forth-
coming parliamentary elections in the summer of 1953.109 This move was 
inevitable. The opposition to the U.S. military presence had increased 
slowly but steadily in 1952 and early 1953. In the fall of 1952, a new party, 
the National Defense Party, had been formed exclusively for this purpose. 
It signified the revival of nationalism in an organized form--a movement 
made up of intellectuals and left-of-center political elements that had been 
mostly dormant since Iceland's entry into NATO. Another bad sign for the 
Americans was the failure offormer Prime Minister Stefan J6hann 
Stefansson to retain his position as the chairman of the Social Democratic 
Party. He was defeated in late 1952 by a prominent member of the left-
wing, Hannibal Valdimarsson---a populist and something of a maverick, 
who exerted much influence within the trade union movement. As a result, 
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the party adopted a far more negative stance toward the military presence 
than before. Together with the National Defense Party and the Socialist 
party, it was totally opposed to granting the American additional military 
rights in Iceland. 
These new trends undermined the foreign policy agenda of the Progres-
sive Party and cut into its electoral strength. In the 1953 parliamentary 
elections, it lost votes to the National Defense Party, which captured 6% of 
the vote and 2 parliamentary seats. Together with the Independence Party, 
which solidified its position as the largest party, the new National Defense 
party was the clear winner. The left-wing of the Progressive Party had 
traditionally been reluctant to permit the peacetime stationing ofU.S. forces 
in Iceland, but for the sake of party unity, it had not challenged the govern-
ment on the question of its pro-American foreign policy course.110 But 
when the Progressives decided---somewhat reluctantly-to revive the 
government coalition with the Independence Party under the premiership of 
6Iafur Thors, it decided to chart a different foreign policy course than 
pursued by Bjami Benediktsson. From now on, the Americans had to 
worry about keeping what they already had instead of receiving additional 
military rights. It was not only the leftward drift that influenced the political 
climate, but also the unexpected propulsion of the Soviet Union into the top 
rank of Iceland's trading partoers. Since 1948, there had practically been 
no trade relations between the two countries. But the Soviet Union decided 
to fill the vacuum created by the 1952 British landing ban on Icelandic fish 
following the Icelandic decision to extend Iceland's fishery zone from three 
to four miles.111 
This political realignment greatly undermined the position of the United 
States in Iceland. In December, Kristinn Gudmundsson, the new Foreign 
Minister, a protege ofHermann J6nasson, the Chairman of the Progressive 
Party, delivered the first blow by demanding the revision of the Defense 
Agreement. The goal of the Progressi;ves was to seal off the military area in 
Keflavik by erecting a sort of a «Mending WalbH-a fence around it and by 
imposing far stricter rule on off-base movements.! Moreover, they insisted 
on replacing all foreign workers at the base with Icelandic ones and on 
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withdrawing the business license of the American contractor, whose labor 
practices had been the source of much criticism in Iceland. Finally, the 
Progressives wanted the Iceland Defense Force to bring construction 
activities at the base into line with those of other sectors of the economy. 
The rationale for this was to prevent the Iceland Defense Force from 
attracting manpower from other parts of the country and to ease labor 
shortages in the seasonal fish processing industry. 
The bilateral negotiations, which began in the spring of 1954, were long 
and arduous and put a strain on U.S.-Icelandic relations. The Eisenhower 
Administration was prepared to meet some of the Icelandic demands, but it 
was reluctant to do so in others. For one thing, the Americans argued that 
the erection of a fence to close off the base was bound to lower the morale 
of the troops and to cause a great deal of resentment. They also doubted 
that an Icelandic contractor would be in a position to assume the functions 
of the American one. It was not until the Progressives threatened-indi-
rectly-to revoke the Defense Agreement that the Americans finally gave 
in. Fearing the worst, they accepted the replacement of the U.S. contractor 
and the erection of a fence around the base. The Eisenhower Administra-
tion did not return empty - handed from the negotia!ions, because it was 
allowed to raise the ceiling of the number of its troops from 3,900 to 
6,200. 112 But the Americans did not get their biggest prize: the Rangarvellir 
airfield. When the Icelanders refused, during the negotiations, to discuss 
the request before other issues were settled, the Air Force suddenly 
withdrew it for budgetary reasons. Given the emphasis the Americans had 
put on the Rangtirvellir project, this move was something of an enigma. 
But the Air Force seems to have given up all hope of receiving permission 
to establish a SAC base in Iceland. 
The Eisenhower Administration realized by mid-1954 that it had to 
respond to the growing opposition to the military base--a task entrusted to 
a new Ambassador John J. Muccio, a veteran diplomat, who had been 
stationed in Seoul during the first years of the Korean War.113 The NSC 
approved a new policy toward Iceland designed to take into account the 
new political realities. The main purpose of maintaining friendly relations 
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and political and economic stability had not changed. But the NSC wanted 
to do more to counter Soviet influence in Iceland and to encourage more 
cooperation among pro-Western Icelandic politicians.114 For this reason, the 
United States Information Agency (USIA) invited more political leaders, 
artists, trade unionists and journalists to the United States. One target group 
were intellectuals, who, like their European counterparts, were traditionally 
critical of American culture and society. Despite the propaganda aim of 
these visits, they often proved to be beneficial to both sides, not least 
because they led to increased contacts between educational and cultural 
institutions."' 
Efforts to improve U.S. position in Iceland and to combat Communism 
were also directed at the trade union movement."' In 1948, the Social 
Democrats, Independents, and Progressives had wrested control of the 
Federation in Labor from the Socialists. To buttress the anti-Socialist bloc, 
the Americans partly financed the publication of the Federation ofLabor 
official organ, organized visits of trade unionists to the United States, and 
helped devise political strategies before important trade union elections. In 
1954, however, U.S. policy suffered a major setback, when the Socialists 
and the left-wing of the Social Democratic Party joined forces to defeat the 
old majority in elections to the Board of the Federation ofLabor. This 
occurred shortly after Hannibal Valdimarsson had been defeated in his 
reelection bid as Social Democratic Party chairman.117 The <<revolution» in 
the Federation ofLabor was yet another indication of a shift to the Left in 
Icelandic politics. Although the Eisenhower Administration tried to counter 
this trend by expanding its propaganda efforts, it was facing an uphill 
battle. 
The Geneva Summit between Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Soviet 
leadership in the summer of 1955 only reinforced the leftward trend in 
Icelandic politics. The argument became more widely accepted that the 
U.S. military presence was unnecessary because of the relaxation in East-
West tensions."' The meeting in Geneva achieved nothing in concrete 
terms, but the <<Spirit of Geneva» lived on in Iceland as well as in other 
European countries. It also provided the Progressives with an additional 
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argument to resist U.S. and NAlD requests for additional military rights in 
Iceland. 
The Americans realized, of course, that propaganda measures alone 
would not change Icelandic public opinion on the base question. Economic 
inducements might also help. Ironically, coinciding with the slide in Ameri-
can popularity from 1953 to 1955, Iceland was reaping enormous eco-
nomic benefits from the base. Indeed, the suspension of Marshal! Aid in 
1953 had no impact on the Icelandic economy because of the military 
construction activity at the Keflavik. What amounted to a new industry 
was created during this period-an industry that the Icelanders profited 
from without investing a penny. It has been calculated that the purchasing 
power in Iceland jumped 13% in 1953-1954 because of the base rev-
enues."' Beneath the surface, however, there were deep problems. For one 
thing, the base economy increased inflationary pressures that led to easy 
credit, excessive investments, and an unstable labor market. Since the 
Icelandic Government was also to blame for its lax economic policies, it 
would have been possible to isolate the base economy. But the Icelanders 
were not keen on such schemes. They did not want to be deprived of the 
benefits of the base, even if they wanted to control the pace of 
construction activity. The net result of these economic changes was a long 
general strike in the spring of 1955, which effectively sealed the fate of the 
center-right coalition government between the Progressive Party and the 
Independence Party. 120 Adding an ironic twist to the story, the Eisenhower 
Administration unwittingly facilitated this domestic political reconfiguration 
by refusing to slow down the construction program at the base. By doing 
so, the Americans expressly violated one of the main tenets of the Marshall 
Plan-the need to keep inflation in check. State Department officials were 
aware of this contradiction and tried to address the problem. But their 
colleagues at the Pentagon were fixed on the military aspects of the base 
economy at the exclusion of all others. 121 
As a last ditch effort to reverse their fortunes in Iceland, the Americans 
did two things to assist the Icelandic Government in the economic sphere. 
First, on the initiative of Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, the Eisen-
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bower Administration decided to side-step U.S. laws, stipulating the 
imposition of countervailing duties on fish products from subsidized fish 
industries like that oflceland. 122 What was more, Eisenhower personally 
introduced the idea of buying up the entire Icelandic fish production and to 
give it away to poor countries as a humanitarian gesture. This proposal 
was never implemented, however, because it was feared that it would set a 
bad precedent and open a floodgate of similar requests from other coun-
tries.!'' Second, the Americans offered to finance the construction of a 
cement factory in Iceland-a project that the World Bank had refused to 
underwrite, because the factory was supposed to be government-owned. 
The rationale for this action was not only to improve the U.S. position in 
Iceland but also to forestall the acceptance of a Soviet loan offer.124 The 
Icelandic Government received the bulk of the loan in the spring of 1956. 
But since these measures were too modest and came too late, they failed to 
improve the U.S. position in Iceland or to stabilize the center-right coalition 
government. 
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A Political Challenge to Iceland's West-
ern Integration, 1956-1958 
Since the end of the 1940s, the dream of the chairman of the Progressive 
Party, Hermann J6nasson, had been to form a left-of-center electoral 
alliance with the Social Democratic Party as a counterweight to the Inde-
pendence Party.125 It was not until 1955, however, that the two parties felt 
strong enough to combine forces, paving the way, in the spring of 1956, 
for the formation of an electoral alliance-the <<Alliance ofFear»--as its 
opponents dubbed it. By exploiting the antiquated electoral system, the 
Progressives and Social Democrats hoped to acquire a parliamentary 
majority by attracting a little more than a third of the popular vote. The 
parties wanted to achieve this by pooling their resources--by voting for 
Social Democrats in urban areas and Progressives in rural areas. At the top 
of the foreign policy agenda of the <<Alliance of Fear>> was the cancellation 
of the Defense Treaty. It reflected the growing domestic opposition to the 
base and the perception of a more peaceful international outlook since the 
Geneva Summit. After the Progressives withdrew from the coalition with 
the Independence Party in March 1956, they introduced-together with the 
Social Democrats---a sweeping resolution in the A/thing on the base issue. 
While confirming Iceland's adherence to NATO, it called for the removal of 
U.S. troops and for reverting to the policy of no military presence in 
Iceland in peacetime. This resolution received the support of all parties, 
except for the Independence Party. Its implementation, however, would 
hinge on the outcome of the A/thing elections in June 1956.126 
' Surprisingly, Eisenhower and Dulles publicly expressed sympathy with 
the Icelandic position, hinting that a reduction in the number of American 
troops in Iceland could be possible. 127 But behind the scenes, the Eisen-
hower Administration was determined to try to prevent the revocation of 
the Defense Treaty. To drive home the point, it decided to cease all con-
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struction at Keflavik pending the outcome of the negotiations over the base. 
This move was bound to have a major· economic impact, because the base 
revenues accounted for almost I 0% of Iceland's national income and 20% 
of its foreign currency receipts.128 Understandably, this type of economic 
warfare did not sit well with the Progressives and Social Democrats. 
Foreign Minister Kristinn Gudmundsson accused the Americans of inter-
fering in Icelandic domestic politics by supporting the Independence 
Party.129 While there was no collusion between the Americans and the 
Independents, 130 it was self-evident that the Eisenhower Administration was 
in favor of the only party that supported the Defense Treaty. But its efforts 
to assist it in the election campaign by indirect means were unsuccessful. 
It failed to persuade the World Bank to approve an Icelandic application for 
a developmental loan to finance a big hydro-electric project in the South 
West oflceland on the river Sog. 131 Moreover, the British refused to heed 
the American call for rescinding their landing ban on Icelandic fish before 
the elections, partly because they feared that such action would be inter-
preted as interference in Icelandic domestic affairs, and partly because it 
would give British trawler owners nothing in return. The only direct offer 
of assistance to the Independence Party came from the West Germans. 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer personally offered 6Iafur Thors a $20 million 
loan to fmance the Sog project. But Thors refrained from taking advantage 
of it during the election campaign, probably because he feared that he 
would be accused of working in tandem with the West German Govern-
ment,I32 
Because of the base controversy, the 1956 elections stimulated interna-
tional attention and much press coverage. The uncertainty about its out-
come had not only increased as a result of the creation of the <<Alliance of 
Fear.» Together with a group of left-wing Social Democrats, Hannibal 
Valdimarsson, the President of the Federation ofLabor, had formed an 
electoral alliance with the Socialists-the Popular Alliance. As it turned out, 
the election results proved to be inconclusive: the Independence Party 
reasserted itself as the largest party, with 42% of the vote; the <<Alliance of 
Fear>> received 34%, and the Popular Alliance about 19%. Capturing only 
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4,5%, the National Defense Party lost both of its seats.133 But American 
relief over the failure ofthe «Alliance of Fear>> to achieve absolute major-
ity-and over the defeat of the National Defense Party-soon turned into 
disappointment. Despite its impressive showing, the Independence Party 
had become isolated in Icelandic politics."' The strong third place finish of 
the Socialist-Valdimarsson ticket made it possible for Hermann J6nasson to 
form a left-wing government, comprising the Progressives, the Social 
Democrats, and the Popular Alliance. The main foreign policy plank of 
what was to become known as the «Leftist Government» was to imple-
ment the A/thing resolution on the cancellation of the Defense Agreement. 
The news from Iceland came as a great shock to Washington. The 
Eisenhower Administration could hardly believe that for the first time in the 
history of the Atlantic Alliance, a member government included pro-
Moscow Socialists. The mood in NATO's headquarters in Paris was 
equally gloomy. In conjunction with NATO's Secretary General, Lord 
lsmay, the Icelandic Permanent Representative even stopped sending 
confidential documents to Iceland out of fear that they would land in 
Socialist hands. This decision caused a crisis in Iceland's relations with 
NATO. The Progressives and Social Democrats reacted angrily. After 
making it clear to NATO that they were in full control of Iceland's foreign 
policy and that the ministers of the Popular Alliance would be barred from 
viewing the documents, they demanded full access to them. But when 
NATO--on U.S. insistence-refused to resume the document transfers to 
Iceland, Prime Minister Hermann J6nasson threatened to leave NATO «in 
one hour,» if this policy would not be lifted. Faced with this prospect, 
NATO finally gave in and met the Icelandic demand at the end of Septem-
ber. Still, Iceland did not receive top-level strategic-military plans during the 
1950s and 1960s.135 NATO could point to the lack of an adequate security 
system in Iceland, 136 and for this reason, COSMIC documents were not 
forwarded. 137 This situation did not change until the late 1960s, when new 
security measures were implemented in Iceland for the purpose of 
receiving confidential documents. 
As stipulated in the Defense Treaty, the cancellation clause could not be 
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evoked until NATO had given its opinion. As was to be expected, NATO 
strongly recommended, in an opinion largely drafted by the Americans, that 
U.S. forces be allowed to stay in Iceland. But the Icelandic Government 
seemed to be bent on charting a different foreign policy course.'" From 
the U.S. perspective, the only hope rested with the new Icelandic Foreign 
Minister, Gudmundur i. Gudmundsson, and other members of the right-
wing of the Social Democratic Party, including the President of Iceland, 
Asgeir Asgeirsson. Most of them were deeply skeptical of the A/thing 
resolution and worked toward achieving a compromise with the Ameri-
cans. According to one plan, the Iceland Defense Force would leave the 
country but U.S. and NATO planes and troops would be stationed at the 
Keflavik base on a rotation basis.139 Initially, the Americans did not respond 
favorably to such overtures, for they wanted to avoid as much contact 
with the «Leftist Government>> as possible."' But in September, they 
abandoned their rigid position, sensing a willingness on the part of the 
Social Democrats and Progressives to fmd a solution acceptable to both 
sides and to achieve a split in the Popular Alliance. 141 Moreover, their 
bargaining position had strengthened because of the inability of the Icelan-
dic Government to receive foreign loans to finance its ambitious economic 
plan. 
When the «Leftist Government>> took office in late August, it did not 
expect the Eisenhower Administration to provide it with large-scale eco-
nomic assistance because of its foreign policy agenda. The Progressives 
and Social Democrats, however, put their bets on the West Germans 
because of the loan offer to Olafur Thors before the elections. Prime 
Minister, Hermann J6nasson, wasted no time and sent former Foreign 
Minister, Kristinn Gudmundsson, to Bonn to start negotiations on the loan. 
Yet, since Adenauer had wanted to reward the Independence Party for its 
pro-Western course, Kristinn Gudmundsson 's efforts met with no success. 
When the «Leftist Government>> turned to France, it received a similar 
treatment. The French-and other NATO..governments-agreed with the 
Americans about the undesirability of granting economic concessions 
before the settlement of the base issue.142 Despite this setback, the 
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Progressives and Social Democrats resisted Socialist calls for receiving 
economic assistance from the Soviet Union. Since the barter trade with the 
Soviet Bloc represented already about 35% oflceland's total trade volume 
(the comparable figures for other Western nations were 3-4%), they feared 
that closer ties with it would have negative political as well as economic 
consequences. For this reason, the Progressives and Social Democrats 
saw no other alternative than to ask the Eisenhower Administration for 
economic assistance. 143 
The U.S. and Icelandic governments decided to hold preliminary talks 
on the defense issue in early October in Washington. The Icelandic Gov-
ernment wanted to achieve two goals: to reach a modus vivendi on the 
defense question and to receive economic aid. In the first meeting with 
John Foster Dulles, Acting Foreign Minister, Emil J6nsson, expressed his 
desire for a compromise, hinting that a solution could be found somewhere 
between the A/thing resolution and the American position of status quo 
ante. Equally important, he requested that Vilhjalmur Th6r-the Governor 
of the Icelandic Central Bank and former Foreign Minister-be allowed to 
discuss Iceland's economic problems with U.S. officials before the defense 
talks were resumed. The Americans had no qualms about approving this 
procedure, for it gave them an opportunity to use this informal linking of 
the defense and economic questions to facilitate a settlement. Thus during 
the second meeting with Emil J6nsson, Assistant Secretary of State, 
Herbert Hoover, offered the Icelandic Government a $5 million loan to 
finance the Sog power plant on the condition that it would take care of the 
energy needs of the Keflavik base. The purpose, of course, was to ensure 
the continued presence ofU.S. forces in Iceland. No decisions were made 
during the Washington talks, which were only meant to be exploratory. But 
it was agreed to commence the formal negotiations on the defense question 
in November.144 
What complicated the issue was the effort by the leader of the Socialist 
Party, Einar Olgeirsson, to secure a Soviet loan to bolster the standing of 
the left-wing Popular Alliance in its dealings with its coalition partners. 
When he informed the government, in the middle of October, that the 
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Soviets had given oral assurances of a large loan on advantageous terms, 
the Progressives and Social Democrats, decided to use this offer to 
strengthen their bargaining position vis-a-vis the Americans. They sug-
gested that the Icelandic Government would be hard pressed to accept the 
Soviet offer, if U.S. aid would not be forthcoming. 145 The Americans were 
sensitive to see-saw politics--attempts to play the United States and the 
Soviet Union against each other. But they were equally worried about the 
implications of Iceland's dependence on Communist economic aid for the 
continued operation of the base. Therefore, on October 25, Herbert Hoo-
ver, handed Vilhjalmur Th6r an aide-memo ire designed to solve both the 
military and economic questions. It entailed a quid pro quo: economic aid in 
exchange for continued military rights. The Americans were willing to 
grant an emergency loan of$3 million before the conclusion of the defense 
negotiations. But they insisted that the deal would depend on a <<Satisfac-
tory>> outcome of the bilateral talks.146 
Since September the Icelandic Government had been steadily moving 
away from its hardline stance on the defense question. In late October 
Foreign Minister Gudmundur i. Gudmundsson had hinted that the base 
question would be solved amicably, and Prime Minister, Hermann J6nasson 
was softening his stance on it. 147 What some Social Democrats and 
Progressives had in mind was to extract some limited concessions from 
the Americans--such as force reduction at Keflavik-as a face-saving 
formula designed to prevent the Popular Alliance from withdrawing its 
support for it. But thanks to a major international development, the 
Hungarian Revolution, the Social Democrats and the Progressives felt that 
they could strike a deal with the Americans without putting the life of the 
government on the line. Indeed, the Soviet military intervention in Hungary 
created a storm of protests in Iceland and contributed to a climate of 
intense anti-Communism, which severely undermined the Socialist Party. 
Thus the Icelandic Government decided to abandon its plan to cancel the 
Defense Agreement, citing the precarious international situation after the 
Hungarian Revolution and, for the sake of formality, the Suez Crisis.148 
The U.S.-Icelandic defense negotiations in late November, it turned out, 
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served no other function than to ratifY the status quo ante. But as a sign of 
their gratitude, the Americans reaffirmed their secret pledge from October 
25 to provide the Icelandic Government with economic aid.i49 The leaders 
of the opposition Independent Party, former Prime Minister 6Iafur Thors 
and former Foreign Minister, Bjarni Benediktsson, reacted by accusing the 
government of treating the security oflceland as a barter item. They also 
vented their anger at the Americans for,propping up a left-wing govern-
ment that included pro-Moscow Communists.150 The Eisenhower Adminis-
tration was fully aware of this irony and had been divided on the question 
of providing the government with financial aid. But in the end, strategic 
considerations--the need to maintain the military presenctl--{)utweighed 
ideological concerns about the spread of Communism. 
Although the Icelandic Government denied that there were any links 
between the defense and economic questions, it was determined to let the 
Americans make good on their promise to provide economic aid. In 
January 1957, Vilhjalmur Th6r asked for a $40 million loan to fmance the 
government's economic plan. In the October 25 aide-memoire, the 
Eisenhower Administration had only agreed to provide emergency aid of $3 
million together with an unspecified amount to cover the foreign exchange 
costs of the Sag project estimated at $5 million and a modest PL-480 loan 
to finance the buying of U.S. agricultural surplus goods. The Americans 
had made it clear that it would depend, to a large extent, on the soundness 
of the government's economic policies whether additional aid would be 
. forthcoming.ISI 
When the Social Democrats and Progressives realized that the govern-
ment could only expect a fraction of what it sought in U.S. economic aid, 
they had great difficulty fignring out their next move. Despite the exhorta-
tions of the Socialist leader Einar Olgeirsson, they were still opposed to 
turning to the Soviets for economic assistance. They knew that it could 
spoil their chances of receiving Western loans and stymie efforts to mod-
ernize the Icelandic economy, whose reliance on export subsidies, barter 
trade, currency controls, and import restrictions had much in common 
with the command economies of Eastern Europe. But like in the fall of 
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I 956, the Progressives and Social Democrats felt that they could hardly 
turn down the Soviet offer, if Western countries would not come to the 
rescue. Indeed, in the spring of 1957, the Soviets renewed their oral pledge 
to provide a $25 million loan to be repaid in Icelandic fish.t'2 
The Social Democrats and Progressives wanted to exhaust all other 
means before turning to the East bloc. After intimating that they would 
have to resort to inflationary financing of the projects, they began pressing 
the West Germans and British for economic aid. Both governments were 
willing to grant government guarantees for short-term loans with market 
interest rates. But the Icelanders were seeking large long term loans with 
low interests--in short, political loans. 153 When the Americans decided to 
honor their part of the bargain in connection with the settlement of the 
defense issue, the Social Democrats and Progressives saw this as a small 
step in the right direction. The U.S. provided the Icelandic Government 
with a $5 million loan for the Sag project and a $2.2 million PL-480 loan on 
very generous terms in line with the October 25 aid-memoire.I" 
The main purpose of the aid-memoire was to facilitate the negotiations 
on the base question, but it was also meant to make sure that the Icelandic 
Government would not receive a Soviet loan. In late spring 1957, the 
Americans felt that the Sag and PL-480 loans were insufficient to prevent 
Iceland from slipping further into the Soviet economic orbit. For one thing, 
Einar Olgeirsson was actively working on a plan to force the Icelandic 
Government to accept Soviet economic assistance. One of its features was 
to have the Soviets finance the construction of 12 fishing vessels in East 
Germany with a $3 million loan. Adding a twist to the plot, Olgeirsson 
received the permission of Otto Grotewohl, the East German Prime Minis-
ter, to have the Socialist Minister of Fisheries, Ludvik J6sepsson, sign the 
loan document in East Berlin. Two things would be gained by this scheme: 
on the one hand, Communist economic assistance would bolster the 
position of the Popular Alliance within the Icelandic Government. On the 
other, the signing ceremony would constitute an important step toward the 
de jure recognition of the German Democratic Republic-a move ada-
mantly opposed by the West Germans. 155 
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Sensing that the loan question could turn into a Soviet Cold War victory, 
the Eisenhower Administration suggested that the Icelandic Government 
discuss its economic problems at a NATO-forum. Some Icelandic cabinet 
ministers had already broached this possibility, but the Americans were 
probably instrumental in persuading the Progressives and Social Democrats 
to act on it. On July I, 1957, Iceland's Permanent Delegate to NATO 
submitted a letter to the new Secretary General, Paul-Henri Spaak, request-
ing economic assistance from NATO. Citing recent Soviet loan offers of 
$25 million and $3 million respectively, the Icelandic Government argued 
that it would be deplorable if Western countries would not counter Soviet 
intentions of taking advantage oflceland's economic problems and under-
mine its commitment to the Western Alliance. 
The Icelandic Government stated that it was only seeking normal 
commercial credits, but the letter showed that it had political loans in 
mind.156 Spaak reacted sympathetically to the request, arguing that it served 
the purpose of expanding the cooperation ofNATO-members in other than 
military areas. Adopting a similar stance, the Americans declared their 
willingness to provide part of the loan on the condition that the Icelandic 
Government put its economic house in order and take steps to reduce its 
dependence on the Soviet market. Other NATO-members such as Den-
mark, Norway, Italy and Canada also viewed the request positively. The 
British, however, were adamantly opposed to granting any special favors to 
the Icelanders. Arguing that NATO was not established to serve as a 
banking institution, they added that it would set a bad precedent to offer 
one member something that others could not expect to have. The West 
Germans were also skeptical of providing direct economic aid to Iceland, 
although their opposition was not as vociferous as that of the British. m 
Spaak freely admitted that there was no economic rationale for provid-
ing the Icelanders with assistance. But to him, it was imperative that NATO 
resort to a «political rescue operation>> to prevent the Soviets from exploit-
ing Iceland's economic problems. In an unprecedented move in the history 
of the Western Alliance, he recommended a long-term loan of $9 million 
with low interest rates. Together with several other European members, the 
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Americans immediately supported the proposal. The British reiterated their 
opposition, but they did not try to block it, not least because they were the 
only ones who were holding back. It was decided that several member 
nations, including the Americans, West Germans, Danes, Norwegians, and 
Canadians would share the burden of providing the loan. 158 
An intervention by the Icelandic Government, however, threatened to 
unravel the deal. The Progressives and Social Democrats insisted that no 
more than three NATO-countries take part in the loan. Because economic 
aid of this sort would require parliamentary approval in several NATO-
countries, they wanted to avoid an open discussion about Iceland's eco-
nomic problems abroad. Domestic political considerations were also 
undoubtedly part of the reason. The Independence Party could exploit the 
issue by renewing its charge that the government was using the security of 
Iceland as a bargaining chip to extract economic concessions. 159 In the 
end, the Americans and West Germans were the only ones who provided 
the loan. A third member could not be found, because ultimately other 
member states wanted to avoid participation if possible to save money. The 
U.S.loan of$5 million was granted in December 1957,160 but the West 
German loan of$2 million in April1958. The price for this uneven mixture 
of charity and self-interest was a promise made by the Icelandic Govern-
ment in writing that it would reject the Soviet loan offer as a sign of good 
faith.'" 
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The Stabilization of U.S.-Icelandic Rela-
tions, 1959-1960 
For strategic reasons, the Americans had decided to strengthen a left-wing 
government to maintain their military presence and to reduce Soviet 
influence in Iceland. The first test oflceland 's Western commitment came 
in late 1957 and early 1958, when Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin submit-
ted two letters to Prime Minister Hermann J6nasson, containing proposals 
for postponing nuclear tests, the creation of a nuclear free zone in Central 
Europe, and a non-aggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. 
In the first letter, Bulganin stated his willingness to guarantee the neutrality 
of Iceland on the condition that all foreign troops be removed from it. In 
the second one, the Soviet leader intimated that Iceland was in grave 
danger because the United States had the capability of stationing atomic 
weapons in Iceland. These letters were modeled on similar ones submitted 
to the prime ministers of the other Western states in response to the 
decision-made at the NATO-meeting in December 1957-to create a 
NATO nuclear stockpile and to consider the possibility of stationing inter-
mediate nuclear missiles in member countries. J6nasson replied to 
Bulganin's overtures by stating that the U.S. military base was for defense 
purposes only and that there were no plans to store nuclear weapons in 
Iceland.162 This forceful response was, of course, welcomed by the 
Americans and showed how far the Icelandic Government had moved 
away from its initial stance on the U.S. military presence in 1956. 
The second test oflceland 's Western orientation involved a far more 
explosive issue with potentially wide-ranging implications for Iceland's 
relations with the United States and NATO: the fishery dispute with Britain. 
Only a month after the Icelanders received the West German NATO-loan, 
they triggered a crisis within the Alliance by declaring their intention of 
unilaterally expanding Iceland's fishery limit from 4 to 12 miles. The 
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Americans and other NATO-members had persuaded the Icelandic Govern-
ment to wait for the outcome of the Law of the Sea Conference at Geneva 
in the spring of 1958 before resorting to any unilateral measures."' But 
since the Conference was unable to agree on a universal formula on 
territorial waters and fishery zones, the Socialist Minister of Fisheries, 
LUdvik J6sepsson, succeeded in pressuring his cabinet colleagues into 
issuing the regulation. When it took effect on September I, 1958, the 
British not only refused to honor it but sent war ships to Iceland to protect 
their fishing boats within the 12-mile zone--a move that sparked a «Cod 
War» between Iceland and Britain. 
The United States was in a very delicate situation in the crisis. Gripped 
by nationalistic fervor, Icelanders of all stripes were enraged, when the 
Eisenhower Administration prevented the adoption of a proposal at the Law 
of the Sea Conference that would have sanctioned Iceland's action.164 The 
Americans knew that if the British would use violent force within the 12-
mile zone, it could easily lead to Iceland's withdrawal from NATO and to 
the abrogation of the Defense Agreement with the United States. Therefore, 
the Eisenhower Administration tried to maintain a position of neutrality in 
the fishery dispute, even if it was against the unilateral Icelandic decree. It 
was understandably worried about the potential consequences of the British 
decision to send war ships to Iceland.165 But persistent U.S. efforts to bring 
about a peaceful resolution of the dispute within NATO failed in 1958. It 
was not until the spring of 1960 that the British agreed to cease fishing 
inside the 12-mile zone as a goodwill gesture before the another Law of the 
Sea conference that things calmed down. But when the conference failed 
to produce an agreement and the British hinted that they would resume 
their naval protection. Bjarni Benediktsson, the architect oflceland's NATO 
membership, even threatened to leave the Western Alliance in an informal 
conversation with the U.S. Ambassador in Iceland. The threat was 
probably intended to improve Iceland's bargaining position in the fishery 
dispute. The Americans, however, took it seriously and urged the British to 
show restraint. It is not known whether the British decision not to 
intervene within the 12-mile zone was influenced by Benediktsson's threat 
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or U.S. pressure. But in the summer of 1960s, boths sides showed 
willingness to negotiative a deal. This paved the way for an eventual 
settlement of the dispute in 1961. The British recognized the 12-mile zone 
in return for fishing rights within it for three years.166 Since this was a clear 
victory for the Icelanders, they stopped considering the option of leaving 
NATO because of the British show of force. 
What facilitated the solution of the fishery dispute was the downfall of 
the «Leftist Government>> in 1958. Disagreements over economic policy 
destroyed the first leftist experiment in Icelandic politics since the founding 
of the Icelandic Republic. Despite verbal commitment to NATO to under-
take economic reform based on the recommendation of the IMF or OEEC, 
the <<Leftist Government>> had continued subsidizing exports and failed to 
stop the inflationary pressures brought about by a general wage increase. 
The economy was beset by inflation resulting from a high level of con-
sumer demand coupled with deficit-financed investment and inadequate 
credit controls. Although the Progressives and Social Democrats had tried 
to explain to the public the shortcomings of a system characterized by 
disguised multiple exchange rates and bilateral barter trades, they did not 
manage to persuade the Federation ofLabor of the need to accept wage 
cuts. Hermann J6nasson saw no other alternative than to resign in Decem-
ber 1958. 
After a brief tenure of a Social Democratic minority cabinet, the Inde-
pendent Party and the Social Democratic Party succeeded in forming a 
coalition government in late 1959-the so-called Reconstruction Govern-
ment. Its main domestic political goal was to implement economic reform 
by liberalizing imports, abolishing export subsidies, and devaluing the 
currency. Developed in cooperation with the OEEC and IMF, the plan was 
made possible by a $30 million stabilization aid from these institutions and 
the United States. What ensured its success were record fish catches. The 
formation of the Reconstruction Government marked the beginning of a 
new phase in U.S-Icelandic relations, a phase marked by stability and a 
lack of friction. Although the mission of the Keflavik Base underwent 
important changes from 1958 to 1960, it did not affect the bilateral rela-
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tionship. The government managed to keep public discussion on defense to 
a minimum in its effort to avoid another domestic political showdown over 
the American military presence. 
A case in point was a plan to reduce the U.S. military presence in 
Iceland. Already in 1957, the Defense Department had recommended-
with President Eisenhower's support-the withdrawal of army forces 
from Iceland as a cost-cutting measure.167 Instead, it wanted to provide 
Iceland with NIKE and HAWK anti-aircraft missile systems with nuclear 
warheads. This would not have meant a major realignment ofU.S. military 
structure in Iceland: about 4,000 Air Force and Navy personnel would 
remain in Iceland. But the measure was bound to be sensitive, because the 
army contingent was considered to be the core of the Iceland Defense 
Force--the unit responsible for the defense oflceland. Fearing political 
repercussions in Iceland, U.S. Ambassador, Muccio, advised against the 
proposal. He felt that it could be interpreted as signalling a diminution of 
United States interest in Iceland and as contradicting its arguments for 
retaining the base in 1956.16' The Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic 
(SACLAN1), Jerauld Wright, was also skeptical of the move, arguing that 
except for Scotland, Iceland was the most important key to the defense of 
the Atlantic. Moreover, it would severely hamper the capability of the 
Commander, Iceland Defense Force to defend against airborne or seaborne 
attack and to suppress Communist-inspired civil disorders.169 
Despite these objections, the Eisenhower Administration decided to pull 
out the troops in 1958. To make the measure more palatable to the Iceland-
ers, it was contemplated to present it as a modification ofU.S. forces 
through the replacement ofNIKE and HAWK air defense units.170 But this 
idea was abandoned, when it became clear that .the Army would be unable 
to deploy such units to Iceland in the foreseeable future. 111 For some 
reason, the Americans never seemed to have thought of possible Icelandic 
opposition to the stationing of these missiles on the grounds that they were 
equipped with nuclear warheads. Perhaps U.S. embassy officials in Iceland 
were unaware of this, believing !hat the missiles would have conventional 
warheads (these were dual capability weapons). In any case, it is very 
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unlikely that Iceland would have accepted the NIKE missiles, for it would 
almost certainly have led to a political crisis and to the downfall of the 
government. To be sure, Iceland had no firm policy on nuclear weapons. 
In Premier Hermann J6nasson's response to the Bulganin overture, he did 
not rule out the stationing of nuclear weapons in Iceland. But like the 
Danes and the Norwegians, who voiced their skepticism ofU.S. and 
NATO's increasing reliance on nuclear weapons by adopting the policy of 
not allowing the stationing of such weapons on Danish and Norwegian soil, 
the Icelanders were very sensitive about their use. The United States, it 
turned out, stored similar types ofNIKE missiles at its Thule Base in 
Greenland between 1959 and 1965 to those it planned to station in Iceland. 
This was only revealed for the first time in 1995 and the decision was 
made with the explicit approval of the Danish Prime Minister, H.C. Hansen. 
It was, of course, in clear violation of the Danish non-nuclear policy172 But 
since the Americans never discussed their nuclear plans with Icelandic 
officials, they had no impact on bilateral relations. Instead, the Americ~s 
decided to rely on a significant deployment of ground forces to Iceland m 
an emergency. m As it happened, the decision to withdraw the forces was 
postponed twice because of political developments that could reopen the 
defense question-the escalating «Cod War» between Iceland and the 
United Kingdom and the Icelandic parliamentary elections in 1959.174 It was 
not until 1959 that the troops left without any adverse publicity in Ice-
land.'" 
Another issue, however, threatened to do much harm to U.S.-lcelandic 
relations. In the fall of 1959, a series of incidents involving Iceland Defense 
Force personnel disrupted U.S.-Icelandic relations. The incidents 
themselves were not serious, involving illegal fishing, prisoners' escape, 
and jurisdictional conflicts between the Icelandic and U.S. police at 
Keflavik. But they received banner headlines and sensationalist press 
coverage. The Icelandic Government responded by insisting that the U.S. 
withdraw its new IDF Commander at the base, who had only been there 
for seven weeks.'" Whether it was for this action or not, the incidents 
stopped and tensions soon eased. In the following years, there were 
60 DEFENCE STUDIES 3/1999 
remarkably few cases of civil-military friction. 
The most important strategic change at the Keflavik Base occurred in 
1961, when the Air Force relinquished control of the base to the Navy. m 
Due to improved aircraft and missile technology, the base became less 
important for the Air Force, which did not have to rely on intermediate 
staging areas on the transatlantic route anymore. The strategic value of 
Iceland for the Navy was obvious. It was impossible to control the North 
Atlantic exit for submarines from the north of the Soviet Union except 
through the Icelandic straits. This also entailed a functional change: the 
headquarters of the Barrier Forces of the U.S. Atlantic were moved to 
Keflavik from Argentia, Newfoundland. The purpose was to extend the 
Distant Early Warning System to the GIUK (Greenland, Iceland, UK) line to 
provide an earlier warning time in the event of a Soviet air attack on the 
North American Continent. It meant more emphasis on anti-submarine 
activities between Greenland and the Faroes.178 Despite Socialist protests, 
there was little public opposition to the change. Indeed, except for minor 
irritants, the relations between Iceland and the United States during the 12-
year tenure of the Reconstruction Government proved to be very good. It 
was not until 1971 that the American military presence was challenged 
again. Following a similar domestic political reconfiguration that took place 
in 1956, a «Leftist Government» renewed the demand for the withdrawal 
ofU.S. forces from Iceland. But like in 1956, it failed to make good on its 
promise and was brought down by internal squabbling. The long-term 
result was another period of stability in U.S.-Icelandic defense relations-a 
period that wituessed no major disruptions despite escalating East-West 
tensions in the early 1980s, the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe in 
1989, and the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
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Conclusion 
The dual strategic role of Iceland in U.S. military planning remained fairly 
constant from the end of World War 11 to the middle of the 1950s. It had 
greater potential offensive value for the United States than any other area 
short of England and the area encompassing North Africa and the Middle 
East, and was second only to Greenland for defensive purposes. In Soviet 
hands, the Americans calculated, Iceland would pose a direct threat to the 
security of the United States. Although U.S. military planners envisioned 
the use of Iceland for strategic air operations in wartime, they were never 
able to achieve their goal of establishing a SAC base there. In accordance 
with Icelandic wishes, the peacetime mission of the base reflected a 
defensive posture. The advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles and sea-
launched intermediate missiles in the late 1950s further reduced the impor-
tance of Iceland for the Strategic Air Command. But it continued to be a 
key link in air and sea communications between the United States and 
Europe as well as in the Early Warning system. By the end of the decade, it 
had also become an important base for anti-submarine operations in 
connection with the establishment of the Greenland, Iceland, UK sea-air 
barrier. 
American conceptions of «national security» entailed more than such 
strategic calculations. It also meant defending what Melvyn Leftler has 
termed «core values». Thus political and economic stability would not only 
help maintain U.S. military presence at Keflavik but also lessen the appeal 
of Communist ideology in Iceland. U.S. economic aid for Icelandic devel-
opment projects and military plans to deal with internal subversion were 
part and parcel of this Cold War strategy. But the United States would 
never have been able to project its power and influence into Iceland with-
out some kind of receptivity and reciprocity on the part of the Icelanders. 
The U.S. presence was, indeed, an «empire by invitation.» Icelandic 
62 DEFENCE STUDIES 311999 
governments received military and economic security in return for granting 
the Americans base rights. 
This is not to deny that the United States had considerable political and 
economic leverage vis-a-vis Iceland. The U.S. decision to cease construc-
tion activity at the base in the wake of the A/thing resolution in 1956 and to 
pressure the Western Europeans to refrain from extending loans to the 
«Leftist Govemmenb> undoubtedly contributed to the softening of the 
Icelandic position on the defense question. But this worked both ways. By 
denying the Americans a long-term base lease in 1946, by making the 
peacetime absence of foreign troops a precondition for NATO membership 
in 1949, and by resisting U.S. requests for a SAC base in Iceland in 1953-
1954, the Icelanders managed to restrain U.S. military ambitions. The 
Icelanders were also extremely skillful in extracting economic aid from the 
Americans, receiving almost $70 million in grants and loans between 1948 
and 1960. In addition, the annual base revenues amounted to $12-15 million 
from 1954 to 1960-or about 15-20% of Iceland's foreign currency 
receipts. Despite record fish catches, Iceland would never have experi-
enced, 1952-1957, an average annual rise in national income of about 11% 
without U.S. development loans and base revenues. The same applies to 
the modernization process: domestic savings accounted for only a part of 
an investment program that equalled about 35% of GNP in 1957. But this 
was the price, the Americans paid for political and economic stability, for 
their military presence, and for containing Soviet influence in Iceland. One 
can, indeed, argue that Iceland benefited from two «Marshall Plans.» 
Despite huge war profits, it received about $38 million in Marshall Aid 
from the Americans between 1948 and 1953, more than any other Euro-
pean country in relative terms. And after a hiatus of two years, the United 
States granted Iceland $34 million from 1956 to 1960---the «Leftist 
Govemmenb> $20 million and the «Reconstruction Government» $14 
million in direct or indirect aid to assist in its efforts to "westernize" the 
economy. This economic aid served the same goal as the original Marshall 
Plan: to ensure economic and political stability and to stave off Communist 
encroachments. And this time, it worked: the economic reforms adopted 
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by the «Reconstruction Government>> in 1959-1960, effectively reversed 
the trend toward increased dependence on the barter trade with the Com-
munist bloc and paved the way for a period of stability in U.S.-Icelandic 
relations, which lasted throughout the decade. 
Although Icelandic politicians had forged far stronger personal and 
political relationships with Scandinavia and Western Europe than with the 
United States, many shared American suspicions of Communist intentions. 
Because of Socialist participation in the «Innovation Government,>> these 
ideological ties were not cemented right away. Indeed, outside events-the 
Czech coup and the Korean War-proved to be the catalyst for the conver-
gence of U.S. and Icelandic security interests. The Icelanders themselves 
initiated discussions about the use of the Keflavik Agreement for defensive 
purposes in 1948 and about the invitation of foreign troops in 1950. Of 
course, the Americans had been seeking to establish a military presence in 
Iceland since World War 11. But that the normally cautious and passive 
Icelanders showed some initiative in both cases reflected a sense of 
vulnerability and insecurity. While the main source of this threat perception 
were international developments, it was reinforced by the large Soviet 
fishing fleet near Iceland. Finally, Iceland would undoubtedly never have 
abandoned its traditional policy of neutrality without the leadership of such 
internationalist and pro-Western politicians as Bjarni Benediktsson and 
Stefan J6hann Stefansson. 
But convergence was also accompanied by cultural diffurences and 
misunderstandings. The Americans viewed Communism as a constant 
threat to Icelandic security and pushed for measures aimed at eliminating 
Socialist capability of internal subversion. The Icelanders, on the other 
hand, were far more inclined to reassess their security policies in terms of 
domestic and international developments. To be sure, Bjarni Benediktsson 
and Hermann J6nasson had publicly broached the idea, in early 1953, of 
establishing a National Guard for internal and external purposes. But this 
«trial balloon>> received limited public backing and was shelved.179 This was 
as much a reflection of a different psychology and cultural experience. The 
concept of <<national security» had other connotations in Iceland than in the 
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United States. To the Icelanders, the need to maintain their cultural and 
national identity was considered as important as physical security, except 
during international emergencies. Although Bjarni Benediktsson genuinely 
believed that the Icelandic police was unprepared to handle potential 
political disturbances, he believed that the U.S. military presence would 
deter the Socialists from attempting a coup. 180 The Americans, on the other 
hand, falsely interpreted his concerns about internal security as an exhorta-
tion to develop unilateral military plans to deal with such a contingency 
both before and after the conclusion of the Defense Treaty. Compounding 
the issue was the bureaucratic clash between the State Department and the 
Defense Department on the question of a U.S. role in quelling potential 
Socialist disturbances. 
This leads to the question of domestic political opposition to Iceland's 
policy of Western integration. During this period, the Socialist position was 
the only consistent element in the Icelandic response to U.S. interests in 
Iceland. But the Socialists were never able to flex their muscle without the 
support of neutralist and nationalistic elements within the Social Demo-
cratic Party and the Progressive Party. The arrival of the Iceland Defense 
Force in 1951 was a good case in point: in the absence of the coalescence 
of these forces, resistance was both muted and weak. In 1946, 1949, and 
1956, in contrast, these diverse elements could, with far more effective-
ness, rally around specific goals such as neutralism, cultural nationalism, or 
the rejection of the U.S. military presence. Only in 1956 did this movement 
temporarily manage to reverse Iceland's policy on the presence ofU.S. 
troops. Despite the failures of the Icelandic Left to curtail drastically the 
defense relationship with the United States, it played an important func-
tional role in the debate over Iceland's place within the Atlantic Alliance. 
Indeed, domestic political criticisms had a constraining influence on 
Iceland's foreign policy. Thus, when the three-party coalition government 
contemplated the question of joining NATO, it was forced to make Ice-
land's commitment contingent upon the lowest common denominator: the 
absence of military forces in peacetime. Similarly, domestic political 
reconfigurations-the ascendancy of the Left within the Social Democratic 
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Party and the Federation of Labor coupled with the electoral success of the 
National Defense Party-were important in thwarting U.S. plans to expand 
its military presence in Iceland. 
The history ofU.S.-Icelandic relations in the 1940s and 1950s is full of 
surprises. Despite the adoption of cultural and economic programs de-
signed to stem the leftward drift in Icelandic politics, the Americans 
unwittingly facilitated the formation of the «Leftist Government>> by failing 
to slow down the construction program at Keflavik Airport. Equally 
unexpected was the decision of the United States and NATO to come to the 
economic rescue of the «Leftist Government>> that included pro-Moscow 
Socialists in an attempt to safeguard broader Cold War interests .. Con-
versely, it is ironic that the «Leftist Government,» whose aim was to 
reduce Iceland's reliance on the United States, should have ended up 
becoming more dependent on it than most since the end of World War Il. 
The result was another domestic political realignment in Icelandic politics: 
the formation of the coalition government between the Independent Party 
and the Social Democratic Party. The defeat of the Left-both politically 
and economically-greatly strengthened the U.S. position at the expense of 
that of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the success of the economic program of 
the Reconstruction Government was made possible by the failures of its 
predecessor. The collapse of the «Leftist Government>> weakened the 
Socialist Party and led to a rapid decline in tjte barter trade with the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe. Thus the tenure of the <<Leftist Government>> 
was the precondition for the subsequent stabilization in U.S.-Icelandic 
relations. It was an irony that underscored Iceland's uncertain role during 
the First Cold War-a role epitomized by the tension between strategic 
necessity and nationalistic resistance. Iceland belonged to the Western 
camp, but on its own terms. 
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